Engineering Papers⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Denman, Matthew R.

Publications and source records attributed to Denman, Matthew R..

At least 19 records

Dynamic, risk informed decision support systems and methods

The present disclosure is directed to a decision support system or tool based on a Bayesian Network (BN) framework. The diagnostic support tool is created by using advanced Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) method(s) to construct Bayesian Networks (BNs) that form a Bayesian Decision Support Process (BDSP) to provide science-based decision support for understanding and managing events in complex systems. In an embodiment, the PRA method(s) may include Discrete Dynamic Event Trees (DDETs) and simulations.

Groth, Katrina↗

Rediscovering the Economics of Nuclear Power. White paper

Energy policy can often be narrow and take a short-term view as well as beholden to public opinion as demonstrated by the early decommissioning of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Germany and Belgium after the Fukushima Daiichi event. The subsequent pursuit of renewable electric power generating capacity should not lose sight of the value of technological diversity in an energy portfolio. Domestic market incentives have failed to maintain the U.S.'s technological diversity as demonstrated by the dwindling state of the nuclear power industry. The nuclear power industry faces many challenges, such as aging infrastructure, policy driven production disincentives, and licensing delays, which leave the nuclear power industry at a cross roads. However, there is an opportunity to identify both a socially beneficial technology mix which includes NPPs and corresponding strategies for retaining NPPs in the U.S. energy portfolio. This paper proposes three technical approach options to identify strategies to assist NPPs that will hopefully prove publicly unobtrusive, economically affordable, and potentially profitable.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Building and using dynamic risk-informed diagnosis procedures for complex system accidents

Accidents pose unique challenges for operating crews in complex systems such as nuclear power plants, presenting limitations in plant status information and lack of detailed monitoring, diagnosis, and response planning support. Advances in severe accident simulation and dynamic probabilistic risk assessment provide an opportunity to garner detailed insight into accident scenarios. In this article, we demonstrate how to build and use a framework which leverages dynamic probabilistic risk assessment, simulation, and dynamic Bayesian networks to provide real-time monitoring and diagnostic support for severe accidents in a nuclear power plant. We use general purpose modeling technology, the dynamic Bayesian network, and adapt it for risk management of complex engineering systems. This article presents a prototype model for monitoring and diagnosing system states associated with loss of flow and transient overpower accidents in a generic sodium fast reactor. We discuss using this framework to create a risk-informed accident management framework called Safely Managing Accidental Reactor Transients procedures. This represents a new application of risk assessment, expanding probabilistic risk assessment techniques beyond static decision support into dynamic, real-time models which support accident diagnosis and management.

Groth, Katrina M.↗

How to ADAPT

The ADAPT software allows for the examination of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in complex system transients using the Dynamic Event Tree (DET) methodology. This manual outlines the principles of operation of ADAPT and provides directions for its use. Future plans for the code are briefly outlined.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Intelligent Modeling for Nuclear Power Plant Accident Management

This study explores the viability of using counterfactual reasoning for impact analyses when understanding and responding to “beyond-design-basis” nuclear power plant accidents. Currently, when a severe nuclear power plant accident occurs, plant operators rely on Severe Accident Management Guidelines. However, the current guidelines are limited in scope and depth: for certain types of accidents, plant operators would have to work to mitigate the damage with limited experience and guidance for the particular situation. We aim to fill the need for comprehensive accident support by using a dynamic Bayesian network to aid in the diagnosis of a nuclear reactor’s state and to analyze the impact of possible response measures.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Dynamic event tree analysis with the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis code

The consequences of a transient in an advanced sodium-cooled fast reactor are difficult to capture with the traditional approach to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Numerous safety-relevant systems are passive and may have operational states that cannot be represented by binary success or failure. In addition, the specific order and timing of events may be crucial which necessitates the use of dynamic PRA tools such as ADAPT. The modifications to the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 sodium-cooled fast reactor safety analysis code for linking it to ADAPT to perform a dynamic PRA are described. A test case is used to demonstrate the linking process and to illustrate the type of insights that may be gained with this process. Finally, newly-developed dynamic importance measures are used to assess the significance of reactor parameters/constituents on calculated consequences of initiating events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nuclear Power Plant Cyber Security Discrete Dynamic Event Tree Analysis (LDRD 17-0958) FY17 Report

Instrumentation and control of nuclear power is transforming from analog to modern digital assets. These control systems perform key safety and security functions. This transformation is occurring in new plant designs as well as in the existing fleet of plants as the operation of those plants is extended to 60 years. This transformation introduces new and unknown issues involving both digital asset induced safety issues and security issues. Traditional nuclear power risk assessment tools and cyber security assessment methods have not been modified or developed to address the unique nature of cyber failure modes and of cyber security threat vulnerabilities. iii This Lab-Directed Research and Development project has developed a dynamic cyber-risk in- formed tool to facilitate the analysis of unique cyber failure modes and the time sequencing of cyber faults, both malicious and non-malicious, and impose those cyber exploits and cyber faults onto a nuclear power plant accident sequence simulator code to assess how cyber exploits and cyber faults could interact with a plants digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) system and defeat or circumvent a plants cyber security controls. This was achieved by coupling an existing Sandia National Laboratories nuclear accident dynamic simulator code with a cyber emulytics code to demonstrate real-time simulation of cyber exploits and their impact on automatic DI&C responses. Studying such potential time-sequenced cyber-attacks and their risks (i.e., the associated impact and the associated degree of difficulty to achieve the attack vector) on accident management establishes a technical risk informed framework for developing effective cyber security controls for nuclear power.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Creation of the NaSCoRD Database

This report was written as part of a United States Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy, Advanced Reactor Technologies program funded project to re-create the capabilities of the legacy Centralized Reliability Database Organization (CREDO) database. The CREDO database provided a record of component design and performance documentation across various systems that used sodium as a working fluid. Regaining this capability will allow the DOE complex and the domestic sodium reactor industry to better understand how previous systems were designed and built for use in improving the design and operations of future loops. The contents of this report include: overview of the current state of domestic sodium reliability databases; summary of the ongoing effort to improve, understand, and process the CREDO information; summary of the initial efforts to develop a unified sodium reliability database called the Sodium System Component Reliability Database (NaSCoRD); and explain both how potential users can access the domestic sodium reliability databases and the type of information that can be accessed from these databases.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Modification of the SAS4A Safety Analysis Code for Integration with the ADAPT Discrete Dynamic Event Tree Framework.

It is difficult to assess the consequences of a transient in a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) using traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods, as numerous safety-related sys- tems have passive characteristics. Often there is significant dependence on the value of con- tinuous stochastic parameters rather than binary success/failure determinations. One form of dynamic PRA uses a system simulator to represent the progression of a transient, tracking events through time in a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET). In order to function in a DDET environment, a simulator must have characteristics that make it amenable to changing physical parameters midway through the analysis. The SAS4A SFR system analysis code did not have these characteristics as received. This report describes the code modifications made to allow dynamic operation as well as the linking to a Sandia DDET driver code. A test case is briefly described to demonstrate the utility of the changes.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Conditional Tree Reduction in the ADAPT Framework

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) uses fault tree/event tree analysis to evaluate the environmental impacts of nuclear power plants due to internal or external initiating events. In a fault tree, basic failure events are assembled using primarily And/Or logic to determine the combinations of failures that lead to failure of the system as a whole. An event tree is forward-facing, and begins with a single initiating event. From there the analysis considers what event may occur next, and branches out among the possible configurations of occurrence and non-occurrence of that event. This branching continues until end states are reached. End states may include a safe and stable configuration of the plant, or any number of differing failure states. Both fault and event trees require basic event probabilities as inputs to provide insight on the likelihood of different outcomes. PRA has been applied to nuclear power plants as an analysis tool since the 1975 Reactor Safety Study. In a traditional PRA, the order of events is prescribed by the analyst and each event is typically a binary aleatory uncertainty: occurrence or non-occurrence. Discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) analysis eliminates this subjectivity in ordering of events by using the output of a dynamic system model (simulator) to inform the branching. Branching conditions are triggered by the existence of a relevant plant state in the code, and therefore only occur as physically appropriate. The DDET approach also allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties on a phenomenologically and stochastically consistent platform. A DDET may be orders of magnitude larger than a traditional event tree for the same initiating event, as more of the uncertainty space is likely to be explored and the tree does not require manual assembly. Because of the size, manual inspection of the entire DDET is often infeasible. This problem may be approached from the front by reducing the number of sampled branching values or by online pruning of the tree, thus reducing the total number of branches. Utilizing post-processing techniques to draw actionable insights via clustering has also been proposed. One post-processing tool to reduce the DDET according to user-defined rules has been recently implemented in the Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees (ADAPT) DDET driver code. The tool creates a 'slice' of the DDET comprised of the set of branches that meet a set of user-input rules, for immediate visualization or for further calculations conditional on the rules being met. This extension is expected to ease analysis of the results of large and complex DDETs, leading to greater applicability of DDETs in PRA. It should be emphasized that this tool is a visualization aide and does not impact the theoretical basis of the DDET approach. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Extension of the ADAPT Framework for Multiple Simulators

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) uses fault tree/event tree analysis to evaluate the environmental impacts of nuclear power plants due to internal or external initiating events. In a fault tree, basic failure events are assembled using primarily And/Or logic to determine the combinations of failures that lead to failure of the system as a whole. An event tree is forward-facing, and begins with a single initiating event. From there the analysis considers what event may occur next, and branches out among the possible configurations of occurrence and non-occurrence of that event. This branching continues until end states are reached. End states may include a safe and stable configuration of the plant, or any number of differing failure states. Both fault and event trees require basic event probabilities as inputs to provide insight on the likelihood of different outcomes. PRA has been applied to nuclear power plants as an analysis tool since the 1975 Reactor Safety Study. In a traditional PRA, the order of events is prescribed by the analyst and each event is typically a binary aleatory uncertainty: occurrence or non-occurrence. Discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) analysis eliminates this subjectivity in ordering of events by using the output of a dynamic system model (simulator) to inform the branching. Branching conditions are triggered by the existence of a relevant plant state in the code, and therefore only occur as physically appropriate. The DDET approach also allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties on a phenomenologically and stochastically consistent platform. One limitation of the DDET driver codes developed to date (namely ADAPT, ADS, and MCDET ) is that the tree is driven by a single simulator. The goal of this work is a general multi-simulator driver. This limits the parameter space that may be explored in a single DDET to that which may be covered by a single simulator. In this work, the Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees (ADAPT) code is extended to support multiple arbitrary simulators. This capability will increase the depth and breadth of phenomena that may be analyzed in a single DDET. For example, a large-scale system code may pass the analysis to a more detailed code if certain conditions are met, in order to capture relevant phenomena that would be lost if only the system code were to be used. In addition, the time required to cover a given uncertainty space may be reduced by dynamically identifying and running only the situations that are appropriate given the plant conditions in each simulator. The use of multiple simulators is expected to further reduce subjectivity in PRA by enabling high fidelity modeling of reality. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Dynamic Importance Measures in the ADAPT Framework

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) uses fault tree/event tree analysis to evaluate the environmental impacts of nuclear power plants due to internal or external initiating events. In a fault tree, basic failure events are assembled using primarily And/Or logic to determine the combinations of failures that lead to failure of the system as a whole. An event tree is forward-facing, and begins with a single initiating event. From there the analysis considers what event may occur next, and branches out among the possible configurations of occurrence and non-occurrence of that event. This branching continues until user-defined end states are reached. End states may include a safe and stable configuration of the plant, or any number of differing failure states. Both fault and event trees require basic event probabilities as inputs to provide insight on the likelihood of different outcomes. PRA has been applied to nuclear power plants as an analysis tool since the 1975 Reactor Safety Study. In a traditional PRA, the order of events is prescribed by the analyst and each event is typically a binary aleatory uncertainty: occurrence or non-occurrence. Discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) analysis eliminates this subjectivity in ordering of events by using the output of a dynamic system model (simulator) to inform the branching. Branching conditions are triggered by the existence of a relevant plant state in the code, and therefore only occur as physically appropriate. The DDET approach also allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties on a phenomenologically and stochastically consistent platform. One current limitation of DDETs is the assessment of results, which is not as well developed as in traditional PRA. A concept that is used in PRA to assess the significance of a basic event is the concept of importance measures (IMs). In traditional PRA, IMs only consider the likelihood of occurrence of non-occurrence of a basic event. The application of importance measures to DDETs must take into consideration not only the occurrence and non-occurrence of an event, but also uncertain timing or severity. This work describes three general dynamic importance measures (DIMs) as implemented in the Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees (ADAPT) DDET driver code. The measures account for the change in progression of the DDET resulting from the different values of each uncertain variable under investigation. The DIMs are applied to a sample DDET to demonstrate the type of insights that may be gained from each one. These measures will facilitate comparison of the impact of dynamic branching events on a consequence of interest, which also allow DDETs to be used in prioritizing plant investments. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Interim Status Report for Risk Management for SFRs

Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of passive, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the system's design to take advantage of natural phenomena to manage the accident. Inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, but nonetheless extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety, thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a variety of beyond design basis events with the intent of exploring the utility of a Dynamic Bayesian Network to infer the state of the reactor to inform the operator's corrective actions. These inferences also serve to identify the instruments most critical to informing an operator's actions as candidates for hardening against radiation and other extreme environmental conditions that may exist in an accident. This reduction in uncertainty serves to inform ongoing discussions of how small sodium reactors would be licensed and may serve to reduce regulatory risk and cost for such reactors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 Uncertainty Analysis-Exploration of Core Melt Progression Uncertain Parameters-Volume II

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has conducted an uncertainty analysis (UA) on the Fukushima Daiichi unit (1F1) accident progression with the MELCOR code. Volume I of the 1F1 UA discusses the physical modeling details and time history results of the UA. Volume II of the 1F1 UA discusses the statistical viewpoint. The model used was developed for a previous accident reconstruction investigation jointly sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The goal of this work was to perform a focused evaluation of uncertainty in core damage progression behavior and its effect on key figures-ofmerit (e.g., hydrogen production, fraction of intact fuel, vessel lower head failure) and in doing so assess the applicability of traditional sensitivity analysis techniques.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advance Liquid Metal Reactor Discrete Dynamic Event Tree/Bayesian Network Analysis and Incident Management Guidelines (Risk Management for Sodium Fast Reactors)

Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of self-correcting, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the system's design to manage the accident. Inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, but nonetheless extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety, thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a beyond design basis seismic event with the intent of exploring two issues: (1) can human intervention either improve or worsen the potential end states and (2) can a Bayesian Network be constructed to infer the state of the reactor to inform.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Risk Management for Sodium Fast Reactors.

Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of self - correcting, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the syste m's design to manage the accident. While inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety , thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a beyond design basis seismic event with the intend of exploring two issues : (1) can human intervention either improve or worsen the potential end states and (2) can a Bayes ian Network be constructed to infer the state of the reactor to inform (1). ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author s would like to acknowledge the U.S. Department of E nergy's Office of Nuclear Energy for funding this research through Work Package SR - 14SN100303 under the Advanced Reactor Concepts program. The authors also acknowledge the PRA teams at A rgonne N ational L aborator y , O ak R idge N ational L aborator y , and I daho N ational L aborator y for their continue d contributions to the advanced reactor PRA mission area.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗