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Cynthia H Null

Publications and source records attributed to Cynthia H Null.

14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Exploration Systems Exterior Lighting Design Guidance

Humans are returning to the Moon — this time, to stay. NASA has selected a location that maximizes line-of-sight communication with Earth, solar visibility, and access to water ice: the Lunar South Pole (LSP). While the Sun is more consistently in the lunar sky at the poles, it never rises more than 7° above the horizon in the target landing regions. This harsh lighting environment--never experienced during the Apollo missions or in human spaceflight--presents an engineering challenge: Support and protect functional vision. The human vision system, which despite having a high-dynamic range, cannot see well into bright light and cannot adapt quickly from bright to dark or vice versa. The design of helmets, windows, and lighting solutions must work in a complementary fashion to achieve a system of lighting and functional vision support that enables crews to see into darkness while their eyes are light-adapted and see in bright light while still dark-adapted that protects their eyes from injury. This report brings together information and identifies gaps related to LSP Natural environment (topology, regolith, temperature, lighting, and so forth), NASA historical experience exploring the Moon, human vision capabilities and needs, exploration operations, simulation capabilities and needs (for design verification, training, mission planning, and so forth) and existing engineering, safety, medical and performance requirements related to support human exploration.

Simulation↗
NASA NTRS2024

Comparison of Anthropomorphic Test Device and Human Volunteer Responses in Simulated Landing Impact Tests of U.S. Space Vehicles

United States (U.S.) crewed vehicles are being designed to support the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) human spaceflight programs. Vehicles must be designed to meet NASA’s occupant protection requirements including landing injury assessment with anthropomorphic test devices (ATDs) and analytical models. However, these tools are limited in capturing all injuries that might occur during spacecraft landings. A NASA study of injuries during Soyuz vehicle landings has shown that analytical models are underpredicting occupant injury. Because of the inherent limitations with our analytical tools, human volunteer impact testing was employed to assess flight-like landing conditions of U.S. crewed vehicles. A total of 84 human volunteer tests in 11 different test orientations and g-levels were completed as part of this effort in collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and U.S. vehicle development companies. Human subjects were tested at various realistic landing loads and in the highest fidelity seat and suit components that were available at the time of testing for two U.S. vehicles. Matched-pair ATD tests in the same test conditions were also conducted with small female and midsized male Hybrid III ATDs. ATDs were fully instrumented. Head accelerations and subjective responses were recorded for human subjects. In some cases, chest accelerations were captured. Responses of the ATDs and humans in matched-pair tests were compared. No ATD tests showed evidence for risk of injury based on NASA occupant protection requirements. Human subjects reported 17 cases of discomfort or pain, and 1 human subject was diagnosed with a minor injury that was not evident in the ATD tests. These results provide evidence that ATDs do not capture all potential injury risks, namely lower severity injuries, discomfort, pain, and fit issues. Overall, human testing is beneficial to understanding the true risk of injury to crewmembers during Earth landings.

Teresa M Reiber↗
NASA NTRS2024

Comparison of Anthropomorphic Test Device and Human Volunteer Responses in Simulated Landing Impact Tests of U.S. Space Vehicles

United States (U.S.) crewed vehicles are being designed to support the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) human spaceflight programs. Vehicles must be designed to meet NASA’s occupant protection requirements including landing injury assessment with anthropomorphic test devices (ATDs) and analytical models. However, these tools are limited in capturing all injuries that might occur during spacecraft landings. A NASA study of injuries during Soyuz vehicle landings has shown that analytical models are underpredicting occupant injury. Because of the inherent limitations with our analytical tools, human volunteer impact testing was employed to assess flight-like landing conditions of U.S. crewed vehicles. A total of 84 human volunteer tests in 11 different test orientations and g-levels were completed as part of this effort in collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and U.S. vehicle development companies. Human subjects were tested at various realistic landing loads and in the highest fidelity seat and suit components that were available at the time of testing for two U.S. vehicles. Matched-pair ATD tests in the same test conditions were also conducted with small female and midsized male Hybrid III ATDs. ATDs were fully instrumented. Head accelerations and subjective responses were recorded for human subjects. In some cases, chest accelerations were captured. Responses of the ATDs and humans in matched-pair tests were compared. No ATD tests showed evidence for risk of injury based on NASA occupant protection requirements. Human subjects reported 17 cases of discomfort or pain, and 1 human subject was diagnosed with a minor injury that was not evident in the ATD tests. These results provide evidence that ATDs do not capture all potential injury risks, namely lower severity injuries, discomfort, pain, and fit issues. Overall, human testing is beneficial to understanding the true risk of injury to crewmembers during Earth landings.

Teresa M Reiber↗
NASA NTRS2023

Human Factors Support for On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing Mission 1 (OSAM-1)

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Human Factors Technical Discipline Team was requested by the Satellite Servicing Projects Division at Goddard Space Flight Center to provide support in assessing the design of the On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing Mission 1 (OSAM-1) Mission Operations Center in light of concerns about overcrowding and potential for distractions, as well as assistance in creating a Human-Machine Interface style guide for OSAM-1 user interface design. This report contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing Mis↗
NASA NTRS2020

Guidance for Human Error Analysis (HEA)

NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems in NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2C requires Program Managers to conduct a human error analysis (HEA) for all mission phases. The purpose of the HEA is to enable programs to understand and manage potential catastrophic hazards that could be caused by human error, understand the relative risks and uncertainties within the system design, and influence decisions throughout the system lifecycle. This document provides guidance to NASA civil servants and contractors on how the Agency’s HEA requirement can be fulfilled.

Human Error Analysis; NASA Procedural Requirement;↗
NASA NTRS2019

Human Systems Integration (HSI) for Safety- Critical Range Operations at Wallops Flight Facility (WFF)

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Human Factors (HF) Technical Discipline Team (TDT) funded a preliminary study in 2017 that was narrowly focused within the Range Data Display System (RDDS) scope of display design requirements based on schedule and resources. Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) personnel involved in the previous study asked for a broader Human Systems Integration (HSI) involvement that would span both the RDDS and Flight Termination System (FTS) projects and assist with identifying HSI best practices, via appropriate standards and guidelines, that if properly implemented should result in a more effective and efficient Range Safety Operations. WFF Range Safety Operations has expressed a need to assess the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the various personnel on console during launches to identify existing and potential efficiencies and incorporate them in the new system design. This assessment addresses that need.

Cynthia H Null↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Expanding Our Understanding of What Constitutes a Safety-Relevant Occurrence

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. The study of human contributions to safety represents a vast and largely unexplored opportunity to learn. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform system design, safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors.

Jon B Holbrook↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Unintended Consequences of Focusing on Human Error (And How You Can Help)

The literature on human performance is rich with findings of cognitive failures and methods to identify, label, and measure them. In many real-world contexts, however, outcomes are driven far more by successful than failed cognition. Designers of systems intended for human use, in an effort to be “data driven,” rely upon findings from the cognitive performance literature to inform their system designs. When most available data are about human error, data-driven designs focus on the human primarily as a source of failure. Designs intended to support or replace humans often fail to acknowledge or understand the capabilities that humans routinely contribute to successful performance. Consequently, designs intended to “protect” the system from “error-prone” humans can design-out the capability for the human to effectively intervene or adapt. The development of paradigms to study successful human performance represents a significant and largely untapped opportunity for research in cognition.

Jon Holbrook↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Comparison of Anthropomorphic Test Device and Human Volunteer Responses in Simulated Landing Impact Tests of U.S. Space Vehicles

United States (U.S.) crewed vehicles are being designed to support the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) human spaceflight programs. Vehicles must be designed to meet NASA’s occupant protection requirements including landing injury assessment with anthropomorphic test devices (ATDs) and analytical models. However, these tools are limited in capturing all injuries that might occur during spacecraft landings. A NASA study of injuries during Soyuz vehicle landings has shown that analytical models are underpredicting occupant injury. Because of the inherent limitations with our analytical tools, human volunteer impact testing was employed to assess flight-like landing conditions of U.S. crewed vehicles. A total of 84 human volunteer tests in 11 different test orientations and g-levels were completed as part of this effort in collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and U.S. vehicle development companies. Human subjects were tested at various realistic landing loads and in the highest fidelity seat and suit components that were available at the time of testing for two U.S. vehicles. Matched-pair ATD tests in the same test conditions were also conducted with small female and midsized male Hybrid III ATDs. ATDs were fully instrumented. Head accelerations and subjective responses were recorded for human subjects. In some cases, chest accelerations were captured. Responses of the ATDs and humans in matched-pair tests were compared. No ATD tests showed evidence for risk of injury based on NASA occupant protection requirements. Human subjects reported 17 cases of discomfort or pain, and 1 human subject was diagnosed with a minor injury that was not evident in the ATD tests. These results provide evidence that ATDs do not capture all potential injury risks, namely lower severity injuries, discomfort, pain, and fit issues. Overall, human testing is beneficial to understanding the true risk of injury to crewmembers during Earth landings.

Teresa M Reiber↗