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Croft, Stephen

Publications and source records attributed to Croft, Stephen.

At least 37 records · Page 2

Consistency of $^{16}O(n,α)$ cross sections

The evaluated $^{16}O(n,α)$ cross sections in the ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data library remain uncertain because of systematic discrepancies in the measured data. In the energy region below the first excited state, R-matrix analyses rely heavily on the inverse reaction, and in particular, they rely on the measured $^{13}C(α,n)^{16}O$ cross sections reported by Bair et al. in 1973 and Harissopulos et al. in 2005. The Harissopulos cross section values are systematically lower than those previously reported by Bair. Here, drawing on the available experimental information, this paper briefly describes and demonstrates that the two sets of measured cross sections are consistent.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Gamma ray Imaging Based Methods to Improve the Accuracy of Uranium Holdup Quantification

Deposits in commercial uranium processing facilities of interest to nuclear safeguards are predominantly low enriched uranium (LEU). The shapes and sizes of holdup deposits can vary significantly, thus making it difficult to model the deposits accurately for calibration purposes. This presents a challenge to currently employed methods such as the Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) that rely on quantifying 235U mass by simplifying deposit shapes as a point, a line, or an area. In this work, gamma ray imaging using high energy resolution Germanium Gamma Imagers (GeGI™) is employed to determine the distribution of uranium inside the source containment. Two types of imaging methods are employed; coded-aperture imaging and Compton imaging. Gamma-ray emissions seen in different regions of the image are quantified using an inverse gamma-ray transport solver being developed at ORNL. Using measured data, the inverse method will be used to solve for unknown source parameters such as source matrix thickness, density, and attenuation due to container wall and shielding. The intrinsic efficiency of the detector is determined based on a library of built-in response functions and key dimensions of the detector (e.g., thickness and radius of the detector crystal). Measurements are performed in both imaging modalities using uranium sources of well-known masses and enrichments configured inside mocked-up holdup fixtures. Results from the two imaging modalities are intercompared. The paper presents preliminary results of the imaging measurements and the progress made in the computational methods to quantify uranium mass.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Gamma Equipment System Requirements by Application

This document outlines a set of requirements for gamma sensitive systems applied to three different applications: (1) homeland security (search and identification); (2) in-situ quantification; and (3) quantification in a material characterization laboratory. These three applications represent a range of activities that a country might use for locating, identifying, and quantifying radioactive material. These applications require increasing accuracy and system advancements, and skill levels. This document considers systems with various detector types and are characterized by their energy resolution: (1) low resolution (e.g., NaI(Tl) scintillation) and (2) higher resolution (e.g., high-purity germanium [HPGe] solid state) systems. The higher resolution systems also include cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) and only mechanically cooled HPGe systems are considered. These detectors and their associated acquisition hardware and analysis software afford a broad range of capabilities with corresponding ranges of complexity, maintainability, and cost. Ultimately, the equipment must meet the measurement goals of the application, and compliance with a given list of hardware specifications does not in itself guarantee meeting those goals. Examples of typical performance objectives for international safeguards applications are documented in International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials (IAEA, STR-368, November 2010). Selection of the detector type best suited to a specific application is often a compromise between “state of the art” or best available option and what is practical.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear Data – Benchmarking 19 F(α,n) Yield Data for Nuclear Safeguards

Fluorine compounds of U and Pu are ubiquitous in the nuclear fuel cycle, so F(α,n) neutrons are an important signature and quantitative source term that needs to be understood for physics-based interpretation of nondestructive assay measurements. Historically there have been large differences in the basic nuclear data for this reaction reported by various groups. UF 6 is the most prominent material in the nuclear fuel cycle, with the potential for short-term production into weaponizable form. Verification of bulk quantities, natural feed, depleted tails, and especially low enriched product in cylinders is particularly important. The principal physical measurement is neutron counting. For enriched material, the 19 F(α,n) reaction, driven by 234U, is the dominant source of neutrons. Basic nuclear data, cross sections, needed to calculate the yield, as well as information on the source spectrum for sensitivity studies are sparse and highly discrepant. This limits defensible physics-based performance evaluations. The same applies to holdup and criticality studies in which hydrated uranyl fluoride is the material of interest which accumulates in enrichment facilities. In the future we anticipate that the physics community will have made improved accelerator-based measurements and undertaken a more thorough evaluation and adjustment of all relevant available data. But in the short term, this does not help the safeguards community face the pressing real-world nondestructive assay requirements. To address this need, we have performed quality neutron measurements on UF6 materials using well-known material and high-capability neutron counters. A robust determination of the n/s/g of 234 U in UF 6 was generated along with a scientifically defensible uncertainty analysis. The weighted average value of the neutron yield is 509 n/s/g 234 U with a random uncertainty of approximately 1%. Dominant sources of systematic uncertainty are in the efficiency determination where we incur approximately 1.1% relative standard deviation associated with the 252 Cf reference source and about 0.9% uncertainty coming from the uncertainty in the F(α,n) spectrum. The stated uncertainties are an order of magnitude better than current data based on accelerator data reported in the literature. Aside from being of immediate and direct use by the safeguards community, this result will serve as an enduring integral benchmark for subsequent data evaluations that will need to match it in order to be credible. In addition to yield normalization, safeguards users of F(α,n) data also need guidance of the neutron emission spectrum. We have generated a neutron emission using a modified version of the well-known SOURCES 4C code, updated with new alpha stopping power coefficients, and a blended microscopic cross section data set. The yield and spectra are available in a form that MCNP users can readily use.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Guide for Employing High-Resolution Gamma Spectroscopy for 252Cf Source Age and Isotopic Composition

Californium-252 is commonly used as a calibration source for neutron coincidence and neutron multiplicity counting in nuclear safeguards. Accurate knowledge of the neutron emission rate, age, and isotopics of the source (i.e., “source term”) are important for ensuring the best possible accuracies in item assay results. Californium-252 sources are not usually measured using gamma spectrometry, because of the assumption that their gamma-ray spectra appear to provide little information. However, gamma-ray signatures produced from 252Cf spontaneous fission products and odd-numbered Cf isotopes can be useful in determining source age and Cf isotopic composition. We demonstrate the utility of high-resolution gamma spectrometry in determining the age and isotopics of Cf neutron sources. In this work, five 252Cf sources were measured using a high-purity germanium detector. The neutron flux was small enough that radiation damage from prolonged neutron exposure was not substantial. Spectra were collected in 2-hour increments for 42–48 hours for quality control. The 2-hour spectra were added together to create a single spectrum for each source, and peak analyses were performed. Source ages were determined using a method that involved experimentally measuring the ratio of the gamma-ray emission rate of the 661.657 keV from 137Cs relative to a short-lived fission product and exploiting the dependence of this ratio on the source age. Source age was solved for using emission rates from four different gamma lines from four short-lived spontaneous fission products. Analysis results from all four fission products returned statistically similar source ages, but two had uncertainties greater than 25% because of high spontaneous fission product yield uncertainties as nominally high as 63%. Choosing short-lived fission products with small yield uncertainties is most important for accurately calculating source age. Additionally, the calculated ages did not always match the time since 248Cm separation well, which is often assumed to be the source age on the technical data sheet provided by the manufacturer. Activity ratios of 249Cf to 251Cf, the only Cf gamma emitters present in a 252Cf source, also did not match between experimental data and data on the technical data sheet provided by the vendor. It is thus recommended that newly purchased Cf sources be examined using gamma spectrometry to determine the source age and confirm isotopic composition of a 252Cf calibration source.

Watson, Mara M.↗

Total Measurement Uncertainty in Neutron Coincidence Multiplicity Analysis

Neutron multiplicity analysis is a widely used technique in international safeguards and is most commonly applied to the assay of product and scrap materials in the production of mixed oxide fuel. The typical neutron multiplicity analysis applies only a crude, almost cursory, uncertainty analysis limited to propagation of statistical errors in the derived singles, doubles, and triples count rates through the point source model. While these analyses do not account for uncertainties in basic detector parameters (e.g., efficiency or gate utilization factors), nuclear data, or covariances between any of these values, measurement uncertainties are often quoted in the range of 1–2% of the resulting mass values. In this work, we examined the impact of the nuclear data and instrumentation uncertainties on the multiplicity assay result for various counting regimes using the point-model equations as the basis for discussion. Potential biases introduced by the current nuclear data set on the measurement and the need for a more complete error treatment when we progress beyond empirical calibrations based on highly representative items will be discussed.

Mcelroy Jr, Robert↗

A Self-Irradiation Correction for the Hybrid K-Edge Densitometer

Hybrid x-ray fluorescence and K-edge densitometry is used at nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities to determine the concentrations of uranium and plutonium in the input accountability vessel. The uranium concentration is determined by K-edge densitometry, that is, from the step-difference in transmission on either side of the K-absorption edge measured using a continuous x-ray spectrum on a vial of the solution defining a well-known geometry. Historically this was done using a basic region of interest analysis but recently to accommodate more challenging solution full spectral analysis has been developed with considerable benefits. In parallel with the transmission measurement, the relative plutonium-to-uranium concentration is obtained from the relative strength of the x-ray–induced K-shell x-ray fluorescence production measured at a backward angle in energy-dispersive mode. However, gamma-ray emissions from fission products present in the solution also cause fluorescence of the characteristic actinide x-rays. Uncorrected, these self-irradiation–induced x-rays can introduce a bias into the reported U:Pu result. The commonly implemented method to correct this interference requires acquisition of a long (~8 hour) passive spectra for the sample. Although effective, it is often impractical to perform a passive measurement on every sample such that a representative passive spectrum is used. We have developed an alternative correction methodology using only the active x-ray fluorescence spectrum that eliminates the requirement for the time-consuming passive count. The active self-interrogation methodology will be discussed and initial performance results presented.

Mcelroy Jr, Robert↗

Characterizing laser-plasma ion accelerators driving an intense neutron beam via nuclear signatures

Compact, bright neutron sources are opening up several emerging applications including detection of nuclear materials for national security applications. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, we have used a short-pulse laser to accelerate deuterons in the relativistic transparency regime. These deuterons impinge on a beryllium converter to generate neutrons. During the initial experiments where these neutrons were used for active interrogation of uranium and plutonium, we observed β-delayed neutron production from decay of 9 Li, formed by the high-energy deuteron bombardment of the beryllium converter. Analysis of the delayed neutrons provides novel evidence of the divergence of the highest energy portion of the deuterons (i.e., above 10 MeV/nucleon) from the laser axis, a documented feature of the breakout afterburner laser-plasma ion acceleration mechanism. Furthermore, these delayed neutrons form the basis of non-intrusive diagnostics for determining the features of deuteron acceleration as well as monitoring neutron production for the next generation of laser-driven neutron sources.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

In-depth evaluation of 252 Cf absolute calibration by passive neutron correlation counting method

252 Cf neutron sources are particularly convenient, and therefore widely used, to characterize and calibrate many kinds of neutron detectors for both scientific and technological applications. An emerging interest is the use of 252 Cf to calibrate neutron correlation counters for the verification and assay of Pu-items as part of the international effort to safeguard nuclear materials. Passive neutron correlation counting (PNCC) methods, combined with knowledge of the fission neutron multiplicity distribution, can be used as an absolute technique to determine the neutron emission rate of 252 Cf sources. This means that common equipment used by the safeguards community can, in principle, be used to self-certify, to high accuracy, the strength of physically small 252 Cf sealed sources for use in calibration. This is the first step in using 252Cf in place of extensive Pu reference materials for experimental calibration by the safeguards community. The theoretical foundation is already clear but the present work presents the first systematic attempt at demonstrating the practical utility of the concept across a variety of typical instruments. We compare four emission rate estimators for four detector configurations on a common source previously certified by the MnSO 4 -bath technique. We find that the estimator based on the singles to doubles rate ratio provides consistent and precise results across all of the instruments and that these agree with the MnSO 4 -bath technique within combined uncertainties. This success suggests that the absolute PNCC method could become a technically defensible and commonly used, method capable of sub 1% accuracy for routine calibration work.

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS↗

The specific ( α ,n) production rate for 234 U in UF 6

Natural, depleted, and low enriched uranium hexafluoride is manufactured and transported on an industrial scale to support commercial nuclear power plant operation. One-way material production and flow is verified by nuclear safeguards inspectorates is by neutron counting. The dominant neutron source term is ( α ,n) production due to 234 U which gets enriched/depleted along with 235 U. We describe recent efforts to accurately determine the ( α ,n)/s/g of 234 U in UF 6 . This piece of nuclear data is of direct value to the nuclear safeguards community in the science-based verification and assay of bulk uranium hexafluoride. It also provides a benchmark on codes that calculate yield curves for various compounds from cross section data, and hence, provides a scale or normalization constraint on evaluated basic cross section data. Finally, in turn, evaluated basic data allows the yield from other materials to be calculated; for instance, moist uranyl fluoride, which is of interest in holdup measurements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Verification Data Pattern Recognition and Change Detection at the Neutron Instrument Level

As the pressure on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards resources increases, there is a drive to essentially “do more with less.” New ways of using current verification instrumentation and visualizing the collected data are needed, coupled with maintaining and sustaining the current safeguards instrumentation fleet. This paper explores how to innovate with current safeguards neutron instrumentation using data-driven algorithms at the instrument level. A concept is described for upgrading current neutron counting systems with modern electronics by leveraging electronics developments in other fields (e.g., high-energy physics) to facilitate full list mode data acquisition and, therefore, expand existing analyses to pattern recognition and change detection at the instrument level. The aim is to advance correlated neutron counting by improving the reliability of detecting nuclear material diversion and, at the same time, to improve the sustainability of those systems. It is likely that upgrading existing systems with new hardware and software is more cost-effective than replacing systems with other novel systems that might meet this need. A specific project example is highlighted in which a system was upgraded by retrofitting the standard uranium neutron collar detector with new electronics; as a result, verification data can be analyzed in new ways. A new neutron analysis method, the “List Mode Response Matrix,” has been developed to analyze every pulse train from the detector array and thus enable the verification of spatial information about the assay item for safeguards inspections. This project has improved the reliability of resolving individual fuel pin locations within a given fresh fuel assembly and the percentage of partial defects detected. Herein, the overall concept of upgrading current neutron counting systems is discussed with respect to the potential increase in analysis capabilities. In addition, the details and results of the list mode collar project are discussed.

Worrall, Louise G.↗

Safeguards Challenges and Safeguards Technology Needs Assessment for Leading Thorium Fuel Cycles

Several thorium fuel cycle variants are currently being actively pursued by the global nuclear energy community. These variants have short-, medium-, and long-term deployment pathways in a variety of reactor types, including thorium-fueled molten salt reactors. Those pathways in turn give rise to a variety of fuel designs, fuel cycle facilities, and nuclear material processing requirements. These emerging fuel cycles will impact the technical implementation of safeguards, and they already raise questions about the applicability of current verification technologies. To address this issue, research is being performed to produce a detailed safeguards technology road map. It will include a needs assessment of the detection research and development (R&D;) necessary to transition the current safeguards technology toolkit to meet the verification needs of thorium fuel cycles, and to formulate the scientific basis for building new instrumentation to fill any potential capability gaps. The purpose of this technology road map is to define and inform on the safeguards technology needs for thorium fuel cycles, reflecting only the leading candidate thorium fuel cycles prioritized based on implementation timescales and the current direction of international programs. This work provides a guide to the priorities for future directed R&D; needed to bring the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of safeguards detection solutions in line with the higher TRLs of the most promising thorium fuel cycles. Herein, a summary is presented of thorium fuel cycle options and activities currently under way worldwide, which provides the technical basis for the needs evaluation. The key synergies and differences between these fuel cycles and current conventional uranium- and plutonium-based fuel cycles will be discussed from a nuclear material accountancy and detection standpoint. Reactor inventory calculations, fuel cycle simulations, and conclusions from the safeguards technology needs assessment will be presented, together with plans for experimental validation.

Worrall, Louise G.↗

Investigating the non-ideal behavior of the Amptek A111 charge sensitive preamplifier & discriminator board— 3 He proportional counter combination used in common safeguards neutron coincidence counters

Neutron coincidence counting is a well-established technique used for the nondestructive quantification of specialnuclear material during international safeguards inspections. The neutron counters are commonly designedwith an annular body, centered about an inner well or cavity into which a measurement item is placed,and the moderating annulus is populated with 3 He tubes connected to a varying number of preamplifiers.The Canberra Industries JAB-01 preamplifier/amplifier/discriminator board is employed within the company’sneutron coincidence counters, built for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-ideal behavior ofthese boards was identified during a detector characterization, using list mode data acquisition, of a CanberraIndustries JCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar implementing four JAB-01 boards. List mode data acquisition andanalysis reveals features that have commonly been overlooked by historic timing gate selection while using shiftregister data acquisition methods, which are routinely adopted in international safeguards. It has been shownthat double pulsing effects are not fully captured within the predelay setting; therefore, they may influencethe response of the system within the standard operating regime. We set out to identify and correct for doublepulsing in our post analysis of neutron pulse trains, while isolating this behavior to the relevant system. Tounderstand and potentially address these concerns, the responses of two different JAB-01 board systems – theJCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar and a modified JCC-51 Active Well Neutron Coincidence Counter – arecompared with the responses of an AnTech Inc. N2071 Neutron Coincidence Collar that also uses an amplifierbuilt on the Amptek A111 Charge Sensitive Preamplifier & Discriminator chip, and a JCC-71 that employs custompreamplifiers designed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

42 ENGINEERING↗