Engineering topics

Cone, Andrew

Publications and source records attributed to Cone, Andrew.

9 records

NASA NTRS2019

Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Performance for High-Speed UAS and Non-Cooperative Aircraft

This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.

UAS↗

NASA NTRS2018

TCAS Alerts from Simulated Urban Air Mobility Flights Along FAA Helicopter Routes in Dallas-Fort Worth

This is a presentation of the current state of a TCAS study being conducted by the ATM-X project. This study examines the rate at which an urban air mobility vehicle flying along existing helicopter routes near DFW will trigger alerts on the TCAS II systems equipped on commercial airliners flying in the D10 TRACON of DFW airspace. The presentation will cover initial results, as well as next steps on the path towards producing a full paper. These initial results show that some aircraft could fly along published helicopter routes, while obeying published restrictions, and fly into and out of DFW airport without triggering any TCAS RAs, so long as the airport is operating in South Flow and the UAM vehicles approach and depart; the airport in the same direction as commercial traffic. Attempting to take off opposite the direction of commercial traffic produces a large number of TCAS RAs. Future work will examine North Flow, check sensitivity to aircraft performance, and examine alternative routes.

helicopter routes↗

NASA NTRS2017

Ensuring Interoperability between UAS Detect-and-Avoid and Manned Aircraft Collision Avoidance

The UAS community in the United States has identified the need for a collision avoidance region in which UAS Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) vertical guidance is restricted to preclude interoperability issues with manned aircraft collision avoidance system vertical resolution advisories (RAs). This paper documents the process by which the collision avoidance region was defined. Three candidate definitions were evaluated on 1.3 million simulated pairwise encounters between UAS and manned aircraft covering a wide range of horizontal and vertical closure rates, angles, and miss distances. They were evaluated with regard to UAS DAA interoperability with manned aircraft collision avoidance systems in terms of: 1) the primary objective of restricting DAA vertical guidance before RAs when the aircraft are close, and 2) the secondary objective of avoiding unnecessary restrictions of DAA vertical guidance at a DAA alert when the aircraft are further apart. The collision avoidance region definition that fully achieves the primary objective and best achieves the secondary objective was recommended to and accepted by the UAS community in the United States. By this definition, UAS and manned aircraft are in the collision avoidance region--during which DAA vertical guidance is restricted--when the time to closest point of approach is less than 50 seconds and either the time to co-altitude is less than 50 seconds or the current vertical separation is less than 800 feet.

collision avoidance↗

NASA NTRS2017

Ensuring Interoperability Between Unmanned Aircraft Detect-and-Avoid and Manned Aircraft Collision Avoidance

The Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) community in the United States has identified the need for a collision avoidance region in which UAS Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) vertical guidance is restricted to preclude interoperability issues with manned aircraft collision avoidance system vertical resolution advisories (RAs). This paper documents the process by which the collision avoidance region was defined. Three candidate definitions were evaluated on 1.3 million simulated pairwise encounters between UAS and manned aircraft covering a wide range of horizontal and vertical closure rates, angles, and miss distances. Each definition was evaluated with regard to UAS DAA interoperability with manned aircraft collision avoidance in terms of how well it achieved: 1) the primary objective of restricting DAA vertical guidance prior to RAs when the aircraft are close, and 2) the secondary objective of avoiding unnecessary restrictions of DAA vertical guidance at DAA alerts when the aircraft are further apart. The collision avoidance region definition that fully achieves the primary objective and best achieves the secondary objective was recommended to and accepted by the UAS community in the United States. By this definition, UAS and manned aircraft are in the collision avoidance region where DAA vertical guidance is restricted when the time to closest point of approach (CPA) is less than 50 seconds and either the time to co-altitude is less than 50 seconds or the current vertical separation is less than 800 feet.

unmanned aircraft systems; collision avoidance; in↗

NASA NTRS2017

UAS Well Clear Recovery Against Non-Cooperative Intruders Using Vertical Maneuvers

This paper documents a study that drove the development of a mathematical expression in the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) of detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This equation describes the conditions under which vertical maneuver guidance could be provided during recovery of well clear separation with a non-cooperative VFR aircraft in addition to horizontal maneuver guidance. Although suppressing vertical maneuver guidance in these situations increased the minimum horizontal separation from 500 to 800 feet, the maximum severity of loss of well clear increased in about 35 of the encounters compared to when a vertical maneuver was preferred and allowed. Additionally, analysis of individual cases led to the identification of a class of encounter where vertical rate error had a large effect on horizontal maneuvers due to the difficulty of making the correct left-right turn decision: crossing conflict with intruder changing altitude. These results supported allowing vertical maneuvers when UAS vertical performance exceeds the relative vertical position and velocity accuracy of the DAA tracker given the current velocity of the UAS and the relative vertical position and velocity estimated by the DAA tracker. Looking ahead, these results indicate a need to improve guidance algorithms by utilizing maneuver stability and near mid-air collision risk when determining maneuver guidance to regain well clear separation.

detect and avoid↗

NASA NTRS2016

Effect of Vertical Rate Error on Recovery from Loss of Well Clear Between UAS and Non-Cooperative Intruders

When an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) encounters an intruder and is unable to maintain required temporal and spatial separation between the two vehicles, it is referred to as a loss of well-clear. In this state, the UAS must make its best attempt to regain separation while maximizing the minimum separation between itself and the intruder. When encountering a non-cooperative intruder (an aircraft operating under visual flight rules without ADS-B or an active transponder) the UAS must rely on the radar system to provide the intruders location, velocity, and heading information. As many UAS have limited climb and descent performance, vertical position andor vertical rate errors make it difficult to determine whether an intruder will pass above or below them. To account for that, there is a proposal by RTCA Special Committee 228 to prohibit guidance systems from providing vertical guidance to regain well-clear to UAS in an encounter with a non-cooperative intruder unless their radar system has vertical position error below 175 feet (95) and vertical velocity errors below 200 fpm (95). Two sets of fast-time parametric studies was conducted, each with 54000 pairwise encounters between a UAS and non-cooperative intruder to determine the suitability of offering vertical guidance to regain well clear to a UAS in the presence of radar sensor noise. The UAS was not allowed to maneuver until it received well-clear recovery guidance. The maximum severity of the loss of well-clear was logged and used as the primary indicator of the separation achieved by the UAS. One set of 54000 encounters allowed the UAS to maneuver either vertically or horizontally, while the second permitted horizontal maneuvers, only. Comparing the two data sets allowed researchers to see the effect of allowing vertical guidance to a UAS for a particular encounter and vertical rate error. Study results show there is a small reduction in the average severity of a loss of well-clear when vertical maneuvers are suppressed, for all vertical error rate thresholds examined. However, results also show that in roughly 35 of the encounters where a vertical maneuver was selected, forcing the UAS to do a horizontal maneuver instead increased the severity of the loss of well-clear for that encounter. Finally, results showed a small reduction in the number of severe losses of well-clear when the high performance UAS (2000 fpm climb and descent rate) was allowed to maneuver vertically, and the vertical rate error was below 500 fpm. Overall, the results show that using a single vertical rate threshold is not advisable, and that limiting a UAS to horizontal maneuvers when vertical rate errors are above 175 fpm can make a UAS less safe about a third of the time. It is suggested that the hard limit be removed, and system manufacturers instructed to account for their own UAS performance, as well as vertical rate error and encounter geometry, when determining whether or not to provide vertical guidance to regain well-clear.

detect and avoid↗

NASA NTRS2016

Defining the Collision Avoidance Region for DAA Systems

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will be required to equip with a detect-‐and-‐avoid (DAA) system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to maintain well clear of other aircraft, some of which may be equipped with a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) to mitigate the possibility of mid-‐air collisions. As such, the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA systems are being designed with TCAS interoperability in mind by a group of industry, government, and academic institutions named RTCA Special Committee-228 (SC-228). This document will discuss the development of the spatial-‐temporal volume known as the collision avoidance region in which the DAA system is not allowed to provide vertical guidance to maintain or regain DAA well clear that could conflict with resolution advisories (RAs) issued by the intruder aircraft's TCAS system. Three collision avoidance region definition candidates were developed based on the existing TCAS RA and DAA alerting definitions. They were evaluated against each other in terms of their interoperability with TCAS RAs and DAA alerts in an unmitigated factorial encounter analysis of 1.3 million simulated pairs.

collision avoidance region↗

NASA NTRS2016

ACES M and S: Unmitigated Factorial Encounter Study on DAA/TCAS Interoperability

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements for DAA alerting and guidance systems. This presentation contains the results of two combinatorial encounter analysis studies using NASA's SAA Control fast-time simulation capability for this purpose. In these studies, encounters between two aircraft were simulated one at a time for the full factorial combination of encounter geometries (e.g., encounter angle, CPA offset) and aircraft performance (e.g., ownership and intruder ground speeds and vertical rates). The first study analyzes the relationships (e.g., timeline) between the different alerting-safety regions in the SC-228 MOPS (in order of increasing severity): 1) DAA warning alert, 2) well clear recovery (WCR) guidance, 3) DAA-Collision Avoidance (CA), and 4) TCAS RA. This study will focus primarily on encounter situations in which TCAS RA occurs prior to any of the other alerting-safety boundaries. In particular, this study will investigate whether using vertical distance or vertical distance at closest point of approach (i.e., vertical miss distance or VMD) is more appropriate for the definition of the DAA-CA region. In addition, cases where transitions between different regions skip an intermediate region will be analyzed. The second study in this presentation explores a proposal to use an altitude rate error threshold to determine if vertical maneuvers are acceptable for DAA WCR guidance against non-cooperative intruders. This study incorporates the radar from the Honeywell sensor model and examines a series of pairwise encounters between a non-cooperative intruder and a UAS ownship, with different combinations of intruder states and ownship performance levels. The study uses SAA Control as a simulation platform and pilot model, and Omnibands to provide DWC recovery guidance. Two simulation sets, one that allows vertical DWC recovery guidance and one that does not, are compared to determine if encounters with altitude rate errors above 250 feet-per-minute are more likely to have more severe losses of well clear, as determined by the Loss of Well-Clear Severity metric.

SaaControl↗

NASA NTRS2015

A Researcher's Perspective on Function Allocation and Its Application to Air Traffic Management

Functional Allocation is an important research area for NASA going forward, and aims at exploring a range of potential options for future ATM (Air Traffic Management) operation concepts. The goal of this work is to gain some insight into the relative strengths and limitations of a range of different concepts, and to identify the important variables as well as any critical or threshold values for those variables for each of those concepts. This information will be captured in a form that can be easily referenced, and can then be used by decision makers to chose which concept or concepts best suit the needs of the US NAS (National Airspace System). The work presented here is one researcher's perspective on this process. A brief overview of Functional Allocation will be followed by more detailed discussion about two of the topics being currently investigated, as well as why and how this work differs from the way we have done ATM research in the past. More specifically, the goal of the analysis work is to understand the reasons for any differences in our metrics (such as delay) when adjusting input variables rather than trying to analyze the raw numbers themselves. In other words, finding which variables different concepts are sensitive to is important for this work, while finding a best or recommended operational concept is not. This will be followed by some examples of this process using results from our current studies. Finally, there will be a discussion on where we are in the process as well as our next steps.

Air-Ground Studies↗