Recent work at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has focused on some source term modeling of uranyl nitrate (UN) as part of a comprehensive validation effort employing gamma-ray detector instrumentation for the detection of diversion from declared conversion activities. Conversion, the process by which natural uranium ore (yellowcake) is purified and converted through a series of chemical processes into uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), has historically been excluded from the nuclear safeguards requirements of the 235U-based nuclear fuel cycle. The undeclared diversion of this product material could potentially provide feedstock for a clandestine weapons program for state or non-state entities. Given the changing global political environment and the increased availability of dual-use nuclear technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency has evolved its policies to emphasize safeguarding this potential feedstock material in response to dynamic and evolving potential diversion pathways. To meet the demand for instrumentation testing at conversion facilities, ORNL developed the Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in a natural uranium conversion plant. This work investigates gamma-ray signatures of UN circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluates detector instrumentation sensitivity to UN for safeguards applications. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the UN gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10-90g U/L of naturally enriched UN will be presented. A range of gamma-ray lines was examined and self-attenuation factors were calculated, in addition to attenuation for transmission measurement of density, concentration and enrichment. A detailed uncertainty analysis will be presented providing insights into instrumentation limitations to spoofing.

Dewji, Shaheen A↗

DOE OSTI2012

Comparison of Holdup Measurement Techniques

The measurement of uranium holdup, the residual material left in process equipment such as pipes or ducts, is an integral element of material control and accountability. Not only are the measurements important for accountability, they are also important for criticality safety. The goal in measuring holdup is to quantify the amount of material in the pipes to verify that all material is accounted for (inventory in [inventory out + holdup] = 0) and to ensure that the amount of material heldup is not a criticality risk. There are a number of ways to measure holdup in process equipment; however, this paper will evaluate only two methods (i.e., Holdup Measurement System 4 (HMS-4) and In Situ Object Counting Software (ISOCS)) for specific measurement scenarios. The comparison will use measurements of well-known reference materials in various configurations and will examine the results, uncertainties, repeatability, time required, portability, and cost of each system.

Lousteau, Angela L↗