Engineering topics

Clardy, Dennon

Publications and source records attributed to Clardy, Dennon.

7 records

NASA NTRS2015

Near-Earth Asteroid Scout

Near-Earth asteroids (NEAs) are easily accessible objects in Earth's vicinity. As NASA continues to refine its plans to possibly explore NEAs with humans, initial reconnaissance with comparatively inexpensive robotic precursors is necessary. Obtaining and analyzing relevant data about these bodies via robotic precursors before committing a crew to visit an NEA will significantly minimize crew and mission risk, as well as maximize exploration return potential. The NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory are jointly developing the Near-Earth Asteroid Scout (NEAS) utilizing a low-cost CubeSat platform in response to the current needs for affordable missions with exploration science value. The mission is enabled by the use of an 85-sq m solar sail being developed by MSFC (figs. 1 and 2).

Walden, Amy↗

NASA NTRS2014

Near-Earth Asteroid Scout

Near-Earth Asteroids (NEAs) are an easily accessible object in Earth's vicinity. Detections of NEAs are expected to grow in the near future, offering increasing target opportunities. As NASA continues to refine its plans to possibly explore these small worlds with human explorers, initial reconnaissance with comparatively inexpensive robotic precursors is necessary. Obtaining and analyzing relevant data about these bodies via robotic precursors before committing a crew to visit a NEA will significantly minimize crew and mission risk, as well as maximize exploration return potential. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) are jointly examining a mission concept, tentatively called 'NEA Scout,' utilizing a low-cost CubeSats platform in response to the current needs for affordable missions with exploration science value. The NEA Scout mission concept would be a secondary payload on the Space Launch System (SLS) Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1), the first planned flight of the SLS and the second un-crewed test flight of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV).

McNutt, Leslie↗

NASA NTRS2011

Systems Engineering Using Heritage Spacecraft Technology: Lessons Learned from Discovery and New Frontiers Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced or heritage systems and the system environment identifies unanticipated issues that result in cost overruns or schedule impacts. The Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays resulting from advanced technology or heritage assumptions for 6 D&NF missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that the cost and schedule growth did not result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. Instead, systems engineering processes did not identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement the heritage or advanced technology. This presentation summarizes the study s findings and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the risks inherent in the technology and heritage design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2010

Heritage Systems Engineering Lessons from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for all five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to be the result of technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the systemwide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study s lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2010

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Improving Life-Cycle Cost Management of Spacecraft Missions

This presentation will explore the results of a recent NASA Life-Cycle Cost study and how project managers can use the findings and recommendations to improve planning and coordination early in the formulation cycle and avoid common pitfalls resulting in cost overruns. The typical NASA space science mission will exceed both the initial estimated and the confirmed life-cycle costs by the end of the mission. In a fixed-budget environment, these overruns translate to delays in starting or launching future missions, or in the worst case can lead to cancelled missions. Some of these overruns are due to issues outside the control of the project; others are due to the unpredictable problems (unknown unknowns) that can affect any development project. However, a recent study of life-cycle cost growth by the Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office identified a number of areas that are within the scope of project management to address. The study also found that the majority of the underlying causes for cost overruns are embedded in the project approach during the formulation and early design phases, but the actual impacts typically are not experienced until late in the project life cycle. Thus, project management focus in key areas such as integrated schedule development, management structure and contractor communications processes, heritage and technology assumptions, and operations planning, can be used to validate initial cost assumptions and set in place management processes to avoid the common pitfalls resulting in cost overruns.

Clardy, Dennon↗