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Chappell, Sheryl L.

Publications and source records attributed to Chappell, Sheryl L..

16 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1996

Early Warning: Development of Confidential Incident Reporting Systems

Accidents hardly ever happen without warning. The combination, or sequence, of failures and mistakes that cause an accident may indeed be unique but the individual failures and mistakes rarely are. In the USA in 1974 the crews on two different aircraft misunderstood the same aeronautical chart and descended towards their destination dangerously early towards a mountain. The first crew were in good weather conditions and could see the mountain and resolved their misinterpretation of the chart. The second crew six weeks later were not so lucky. In cloud they had no clues to point out their mistake nor the presence of the mountain. The resulting crash and the ensuing inquiry, which brought to light the previous incident, shocked the country but gave it the impetus to instigate a safety reporting system. This system eventually became the NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The programme collects incident reports from pilots, controllers, mechanics, cabin attendants and many others involved in aviation operations. By disseminating this safety information the ASRS has helped enormously to give US airlines and airspace the highest safety standards. Accident prevention is a goal sought by everyone in the aviation industry and establishing effective incident reporting programmes can go a long way toward achieving that goal. This article will describe the steps and issues required to establish an incident reporting system. The authors summarize the lessons learned from the ASRS, now in its twentieth year of operation and from the Confidential Human Factors Reporting (HER) Programme run by British Airways, an airline that is a recognized world leader in safety reporting and analysis. The differences between government and airline operation of confidential safety reporting systems will be addressed.

OLeary, Mike J.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Managing Situation Awareness on the Flight Deck

Awareness is required of the plane, the path and the people, both now and in the future. The steps to situation awareness are to monitor and evaluate the current situation. Anticipate the future to stay ahead of the airplane and consider contingencies, having a plan for 'what if situations. Continually update and modify the plan and share it with all crew members.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Alaska Humans Factors Safety Study: The Southern Coastal Area

At the request of the Alaska Air Carriers Association, researchers from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, at NASA Ames Research Center, conducted a study on aspects of safety in Alaskan Part 135 air taxi operations. An interview form on human factors safety issues was created by a representative team from the FAA-Alaska, NTSB-Alaska, NASA-ASRS, and representatives of the Alaska Air Carriers Association which was subsequently used in the interviews of pilots and managers. Because of the climate and operational differences, the study was broken into two geographical areas, the southern coastal areas and the northern portion of the state. This presentation addresses the southern coastal areas, specifically: Anchorage, Dillingham, King Salmon, Kodiak, Cold Bay, Juneau, and Ketchikan. The interview questions dealt with many of the potential pressures on pilots and managers associated with the daily air taxi operations in Alaska. The impact of the environmental factors such as the lack of available communication, navigation and weather information systems was evaluated. The results of this study will be used by government and industry working in Alaska. These findings will contribute important information on specific Alaska safety issues for eventual incorporation into training materials and policies that will help to assure the safe conduct of air taxi flights in Alaska.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1995

A New Approach to Measuring Safety with Flight Data

For over two decades, safety has been measured by screening flight data for deviations from prescribed operations. NASA and the FAA are developing a prototype system with a new approach, to complement these event-measurement systems. The premise is that, in addition to these events, much can be gained by analyzing all the flight data on a routine basis. The statistical analyses of this system enable the evaluation of normal as well as extreme operations. The trend analyses make it possible to foresee the potential occurrence of an unsafe operation and intervene before it occurs.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Training and cockpit design to promote expert performance

The behavior of expert pilots in familiar situations is explored and the implications for better training programs and cockpit designs are stated. Experts in familiar operational situations performing highly practiced tasks are said to recognize and respond to complex situations using pattern recognition or intuition. For some tasks this class of behaviors is desirable; performance can be improved by reducing cognitive load and increasing speed and accuracy. Part-task training, training for monitoring and techniques for the transfer of knowledge can facilitate the development of these skills. Methods for promoting pattern recognition through pilot-aircraft interface design include the use of spatial presentations of information and providing triggering events. In some instances, the familiar, well-practiced behavior is not appropriate and it is desirable to prevent the response. When prevention is necessary, barriers can be constructed in the interface to remind the pilot of the inappropriateness of the response.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Who or what saved the day? A comparison of traditional and glass cockpits

This study examined incidents reported to NASAs Aviation Safety Reporting System from a different perspective: rather than focusing on the factors contributing to or causing incidents, this study concentrated on who and what (subsystems and information) enabled the recovery from an anomaly. Incident reports describing altitude deviations were classified as to cockpit type (glass or traditional), flight phase, agent restoring safety, and cockpit subsystems providing specific information that helped restore safety. The data revealed and quantified the agents, information, and factors that 'saved the day'. The flight crews used many sources of information to detect the altitude deviations: altimeter, outside scene, altitude alert, kinesthesia, attitude and communications monitoring. In the glass cockpits the crews also used the map display and autothrottles to detect deviations from assigned altitudes. There was an interaction between the person detecting the anomaly (controller/flight crew) and the type of cockpit. Glass cockpit flight crews detect proportionally more deviations than their counterparts in traditional cockpits, while controllers tend to detect more deviations involving traditional cockpits. There was no effect of cockpit position (captain/first officer). A model that details the flow of altitude information between air traffic control, flight crews, and cockpit subsystems, was developed and validated. This model identifies strengths and weaknesses in the flow of altitude information within the current ground/air system.

Degani, Asaf↗
NASA NTRS1990

Evaluation Of An Aircraft-Collision-Avoidance System

Report describes study of pilots' use of traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS II) in simulated airplane flights. Gives alert by light and sound when another aircraft within 40 s of passing very closely. If other aircraft still poses threat 15 to 20 s later, TCAS II advises pilot to maneuver vertically or to continue on same flightpath but alter rate of ascent or descent. Report describes methodology, summarizes results, and presents conclusions.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Details Of Collision-Avoidance Study

Report provides background information on and detailed description of study of pilots' use of traffic-alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS II) in simulated flights. Described in article, "Evaluation of an Aircraft-Collision-Avoidance System" (ARC-12367). Plans, forms, training narratives, scripts, questionnaires, and other information compiled.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Pilot performance research for TCAS

Three separate studies have been conducted to ascertain pilot responsiveness to advisories generated by the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II). In the first of these, pilot responses to normal TCAS II resolution advisories were evaluated, while the second gave attention to amended advisories and the third to alternative display formats. Within this study's simulated conditions, pilots were able to respond to advisories quickly and accurately. The addition of a target vertical speed range on the resolution advisory display resulted in further improvements of pilot response and accuracy.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Pilots' use of a traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS 2) in simulated air carrier operations. Volume 1: Methodology, summary and conclusions

Pilots' use of and responses to a traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS 2) in simulated air carrier line operations are described in Volume 1. TCAS 2 monitors the positions of nearby aircraft by means of transponder interrogation, and it commands a climb or descent when conflicting aircraft are projected to reach an unsafe closest point-of-approach within 20 to 25 seconds. A different level of information about the location of other air traffic was presented to each of three groups of flight crews during their execution of eight simulated air carrier flights. A fourth group of pilots flew the same segments without TCAS 2 equipment. Traffic conflicts were generated at intervals during the flights; many of the conflict aircraft were visible to the flight crews. The TCAS equipment successfully ameliorated the seriousness of all conflicts; three of four non-TCAS crews had hazardous encounters. Response times to TCAS maneuver commands did not differ as a function of the amount of information provided, nor did response accuracy. Differences in flight experience did not appear to contribute to the small performance differences observed. Pilots used the displays of conflicting traffic to maneuver to avoid unseen traffic before maneuver advisories were issued by the TCAS equipment. The results indicate: (1) that pilots utilize TCAS effectively within the response times allocated by the TCAS logic, and (2) that TCAS 2 is an effective collision avoidance device. Volume II contains the appendices referenced in Volume I, providing details of the experiment and the results, and the text of two reports written in support of the program.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Pilots' use of a traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS 2) in simulated air carrier operations. Volume 2: Appendices

Pilots' use of and responses to a traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS 2) in simulated air carrier line operations are discribed in Volume 1. TCAS 2 monitors the positions of nearby aircraft by means of transponder interrogation, and it commands a climb or descent which conflicting aircraft are projected to reach an unsafe closest point-of-approach within 20 to 25 seconds. A different level of information about the location of other air traffic was presented to each of three groups of flight crews during their execution of eight simulated air carrier flights. A fourth group of pilots flew the same segments without TCAS 2 equipment. Traffic conflicts were generated at intervals during the flights; many of the conflict aircraft were visible to the flight crews. The TCAS equipment successfully ameliorated the seriousness of all conflicts; three of four non-TCAS crews had hazardous encounters. Response times to TCAS maneuver commands did not differ as a function of the amount of information provided, nor did response accuracy. Differences in flight experience did not appear to contribute to the small performance differences observed. Pilots used the displays of conflicting traffic to maneuver to avoid unseen traffic before maneuver advisories were issued by the TCAS equipment. The results indicate: (1) that pilots utilize TCAS effectively within the response times allocated by the TCAS logic, and (2) that TCAS 2 is an effective collision avoidance device. Volume 2 contains the appendices referenced in Volume 1, providing details of the experiment and the results, and the text of two reports written in support of the program.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Avoiding a maneuvering aircraft with TCAS

The present investigation was carried out in NASA's Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility B 727 simulator because of the need for veridical aircraft response. Pilot performance was measured in testing TCAS II after an avoidance maneuver has been initiated. A proposed change to the system will cause the TCAS II to issue a subsequent maneuver. This maneuver may be an increase in climb or descent rate from 1500 to 2500 ft/min, or a change from a climb to a descent or a descent to a climb. Three questions were addressed: (1) can the pilot detect the change in the maneuver advisory, (2) can the pilot respond promptly and accurately to the new advisory, and (3) can the maneuver be performed in the normal operating envelope of the aircraft. The reaction times found in the study suggest that pilots are able to respond within the two seconds targeted by the TCAS logic. The pilot performance data were used to modify the TCAS II logic to reflect actual pilot performance. This will result in a safe and appropriate maneuver selection in the rare instance when the conflicting aircraft maneuvers, and by doing so invalidates the initial maneuver issued by the collision avoidance system.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Pilot response to avoidance regions depicted on alternate TCAS II resolution advisory displays

The objective of this study was to examine pilot reactions to three versions of the resolution advisory (RA) display of the TCAS II. Two modifications to the current system were designed to test the hypothesis that a different lighting pattern might be more effective than the 'red-only' version currently in use. Grouped into three sets, 28 RA displays of the same color pattern ('red-only', 'red-and-green', and 'green-only') were presented to 36 volunteer pilots on an IRIS terminal. The results indicated that the red-and-green display caused the least errors and hastened a quicker response than did the red-only display. Further, a subjective evaluation revealed that the pilots preferred the red-and-green display over the other two options. The red-only display caused the most errors, including seven unnecessary maneuvers. Pilots also responded slowest to this display and it was the least preferred.

Tuttell, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRS1988

The Traffic-Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) in the glass cockpit

This volume contains the contributions of the participants in the NASA Ames Research Center workshop on the traffic-alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) implementation for aircraft with cathode ray tube (CRT) or flat panel displays. To take advantage of the display capability of the advanced-technology aircraft, NASA sponsored this workshop with the intent of bringing together industry personnel, pilots, and researchers so that pertinent issues in the area could be identified. During the 2-day workshop participants addressed a number of issues including: What is the optimum format for TCAS advisories. Where and how should maneuver advisories be presented to the crew. Should the maneuver advisories be presented on the primary flight display. Is it appropriate to have the autopilot perform the avoidance maneuver. Where and how should traffic information be presented to the crew. Should traffic information be combined with weather and navigation information. How much traffic should be shown and what ranges should be used. Contained in the document are the concepts and suggestions produced by the workshop participants.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Information transfer in pilots' use of a collision avoidance system

A flight simulator study of pilots' use of the Traffic-alert and Collision Avoidance System is described. Three levels of information on the location of other air traffic were presented to different groups of airline pilots. The amount of informtion on the location of other traffic had little effect on pilots' performance of the maneuvers commanded by the collision avoidance system. Measured crew responses were similar with no presentation of traffic location, with limited information, and with continuous traffic information. No learning effects were observed, and differences in flight experience did not contribute to the performance difference found.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗