Single-Event Effect Performance of a Commercial ReRAM
We show heavy ion test results of a commercial production-level ReRAM. The memory array is robust to bit upsets. However the ReRAM system is vulnerable to SEFI.
Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Buchner, Stephen.
We show heavy ion test results of a commercial production-level ReRAM. The memory array is robust to bit upsets. However the ReRAM system is vulnerable to SEFI.
We present results for the single-event effect response of commercial production-level resistive random access memories. We found that the resistive memory arrays are immune to heavy ion-induced upsets. However, the devices were susceptible to single-event functional interrupts, due to upsets from the control circuits. The intrinsic radiation tolerant nature of resistive memory makes the technology an attractive consideration for future space applications.
We show heavy ion test results of a commercial production-level ReRAM. The memory array is robust to bit upsets. However the ReRAM system is vulnerable to SEFIs due to upsets in peripheral circuits, including the sense amplifier.
We have presented results of ultra-low dose rate irradiations (< or = 10 mrad(Si)/s) for a variety of radiation hardened and commercial linear bipolar devices. We observed low dose rate enhancement factors exceeding 1.5 in several parts. The worst case of dose rate enhancement resulted in functional failures, which occurred after 10 and 60 krad(Si), for devices irradiated at 0.5 and 10 mrad(Si)/s, respectively. Devices fabricated with radiation hardened processes and designs also displayed dose rate enhancement at below 10 mrad(Si)/s. Furthermore, the data indicated that these devices have not reached the damage saturation point. Therefore the degradation will likely continue to increase with increasing total dose, and the low dose rate enhancement will further magnify. The cases presented here, in addition to previous examples, illustrate the significance and pervasiveness of low dose rate enhancement at dose rates lower than 10 mrad(Si). These results present further challenges for radiation hardness assurance of bipolar linear circuits, and raise the question of whether the current standard test dose rate is conservative enough to bound degradations due to ELDRS.
Single Event Transients (SETs) originating in linear bipolar integrated circuits are known to undermine the reliability of electronic systems operating in the radiation environment of space. Ionizing particle radiation produces a variety of SETs in linear bipolar circuits. The extent to which these SETs threaten system reliability depends on both their shapes (amplitude and width) and their threshold energies. In general, SETs with large amplitudes and widths are the most likely to propagate from a bipolar circuit's output through a subsystem. The danger these SET pose is that, if they become latched in a follow-on circuit, they could cause an erroneous system response. Long-term exposure of linear bipolar circuits to particle radiation produces total ionizing dose (TID) and/or displacement damage dose (DDD) effects that are characterized by a gradual degradation in some of the circuit's electrical parameters. For example, an operational amplifier's gain-bandwidth product is reduced by exposure to ionizing radiation, and it is this reduction that contributes to the distortion of the SET shapes. In this paper, we compare SETs produced in a pristine LM124 operational amplifier with those produced in one exposed to ionizing radiation for three different operating configurations - voltage follower (VF), inverter with gain (IWG), and non-inverter with gain (NIWG). Each configuration produces a unique set of transient shapes that change following exposure to ionizing radiation. An important finding is that the changes depend on operating configuration; some SETs decrease in amplitude, some remain relatively unchanged, some become narrower and some become broader.
Shapes of single event transients (SETs) in a linear bipolar circuit (LM124) change with exposure to total ionizing dose (TID) radiation. SETs shape changes are a direct consequence of TID-induced degradation of bipolar transistor gain. A reduction in transistor gain causes a reduction in the drive current of the current sources in the circuit, and it is the lower drive current that most affects the shapes of large amplitude SETs.
This presentation discusses radiation hardness assurance (RHA) for space systems, providing both the programmatic aspects of RHA and the RHA procedure. RHA consists of all activities undertaken to ensure that the electronics and materials of a space system perform to their design specifications after exposure to the space radiation environment. RHA also pertains to environment definition, part selection, part testing, spacecraft layout, radiation tolerant design, and mission/system/subsystems requirements. RHA procedure consists of establishing mission requirements, defining and evaluating the radiation hazard, selecting and categorizing the appropriate parts, and evaluating circuit response to hazard. The RHA approach is based on risk management and is confined only to parts, it includes spacecraft layout, system/subsystem/circuit design, and system requirements and system operations. RHA should be taken into account in the early phases of a program including the proposal and feasibility analysis phases.
The shapes of single event transients in linear bipolar circuits are distorted by exposure to total ionizing dose radiation. Some transients become broader and others become narrower. Such distortions may affect SET system error rates in a radiation environment. If the transients are broadened by TID, the error rate could increase during the course of a mission, a possibility that has implications for hardness assurance.
The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), the successor to the Hubble Space Telescope, is due to be launched in 2013 with the goal of searching the very distant Universe for stars that formed shortly after the Big Bang. Because this occurred so far back in time, the available light is strongly red-shifted, requiring the use of detectors sensitive to the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. HgCdTe infrared focal plane arrays, cooled to below 30 K to minimize noise, will be used to detect the faint signals. One of the instruments on JWST is the Near Infrared Spectrometer (NIRSPEC) designed to measure the infrared spectra of up to 100 separate galaxies simultaneously. A key component in NIRSPEC is a Micro-Electromechanical System (MEMS), a two-dimensional micro-shutter array (MSA) developed by NASA/GSFC. The MSA is inserted in front of the detector to allow only the light from the galaxies of interest to reach the detector and to block the light from all other sources. The MSA will have to operate at 30 K to minimize the amount of thermal radiation emitted by the optical components from reaching the detector array. It will also have to operate in the space radiation environment that is dominated by the MSA will be exposed to a large total ionizing dose of approximately 200 krad(Si). Following exposure to ionizing radiation, a variety of MEMS have exhibited performance degradation. MEMS contain moving parts that are either controlled or sensed by changes in electric fields. Radiation degradation can be expected for those devices where there is an electric field applied across an insulating layer that is part of the sensing or controlling structure. Ionizing radiation will liberate charge (electrons and holes) in the insulating layers, some of which may be trapped within the insulating layer. Trapped charge will partially cancel the externally applied electric field and lead to changes in the operation of the MEMS. This appears to be a general principle for MEMS. Knowledge of the above principle has raised the concern at NASA that the MSA might also exhibit degraded performance because, i) each shutter flap is a multilayer structure consisting of metallic and insulating layers and ii) the movement of the shutter flaps is partially controlled by the application of an electric field between the shutter flap and the substrate (vertical support grid). The whole mission would be compromised if radiation exposure were to prevent the shutters from opening and closing properly. energetic ionizing particles. Because it is located A unique feature of the MSA is that, as outside the spacecraft and has very little shielding, previously mentioned, it will have to operate at temperatures near 30 K. To date, there are no published reports on how very low temperatures (- 30K) affect the response of MEMS devices to total ionizing dose. Experiments on SiO2 structures at low temperatures (80 K) indicate that the electrons generated by the ionizing radiation are mobile and will move rapidly under the application of an external electric field. Holes, on the other hand, that would normally move in the opposite direction through the SiO2 via a "thermal hopping" process, are effectively immobile at low electric fields as they are trapped close to their generation sites. However, for sufficiently large electric fields (greater than 3 MV/cm) holes are able to move through the SiO2. The larger the field, the more rapidly the holes move. The separation of the electrons and holes leads to a reduced electric field within the insulating layer. To overcome this reduction in electric field, a greater external voltage will have to be applied that alters the normal operation of the device. This report presents the results of radiation testing of the MSA at 60 K. The temperature was higher than the targeted temperature because of a faulty electrical interconnect on the test board. Specifically, our goal was to determine whether the MSA would function propey after a TID of 200 krad(Si).
This viewgraph presentation reviews the challenges for the pulsed laser in the following categories: 1. Metal 2. Package 3. Scaling 4. Exotic materials 5. Novel devices 6. Equipment
This viewgraph presentation reviews the low temperature, Total Ionizing Dose (TID) tests of radiation hardened serial to parallel converter to be used on the James Webb Space Telescope. The test results show that the original HV583 level shifter - a COTS part -was not suitable for JWST because the supply currents exceeded specs after 20 krad( Si) .The HV584 - functionally similar to the HV583 -was designed using RHBD approach that reduced the leakage currents to within acceptable levels and had only a small effect on the level-shifted output voltage.
On November 5, 2001, a processor reset occurred on board the Microwave Anisotropy Probe (MAP), a NASA mission to measure the anisotropy of the microwave radiation left over from the Big Bang. The reset caused the spacecraft to enter a safehold mode from which it took several days to recover. Were that to happen regularly, the entire mission would be compromised, so it was important to find the cause of the reset and, if possible, to mitigate it. NASA assembled a team of engineers that included experts in radiation effects to tackle the problem. The first clue was the observation that the processor reset occurred during a solar event characterized by large increases in the proton and heavy ion fluxes emitted by the sun. To the radiation effects engineers on the team, this strongly suggested that particle radiation might be the culprit, particularly when it was discovered that the reset circuit contained three voltage comparators (LM139). Previous testing revealed that large voltage transients, or glitches appeared at the output of the LM139 when it was exposed to a beam of heavy ions [NI96]. The function of the reset circuit was to monitor the supply voltage and to issue a reset command to the processor should the voltage fall below a reference of 2.5 V [PO02]. Eventually, the team of engineers concluded that ionizing particle radiation from the solar event produced a negative voltage transient on the output of one of the LM139s sufficiently large to reset the processor on MAP. Fortunately, as of the end of 2004, only two such resets have occurred. The reset on MAP was not the first malfunction on a spacecraft attributed to a transient. That occurred shortly after the launch of NASA s TOPEX/Poseidon satellite in 1992. It was suspected, and later confirmed, that an anomaly in the Earth Sensor was caused by a transient in an operational amplifier (OP-15) [KO93]. Over the next few years, problems on TDRS, CASSINI, [PR02] SOHO [HA99,HA01] and TERRA were also attributed to transients. In some cases, such events produced resets by falsely triggering circuits designed to protect against over- voltage or over-current. On at least three occasions, transients caused satellites to switch into "safe mode" in which most of the systems on board the satellites were powered down for an extended period. By the time the satellites were reconfigured and returned to full operational state, much scientific data had been lost. Fortunately, no permanent damage occurred in any of the systems and they were all successfully re-activated.
Over the past 27 years, or so, increased concern over single event effects in spacecraft systems has resulted in research, development and engineering activities centered around a better understanding of the space radiation environment, single event effects predictive methods, ground test protocols, and test facility developments. This research has led to fairly well developed methods for assessing the impact of the space radiation environment on systems that contain SEE sensitive devices and the development of mitigation strategies either at the system or device level.
Abstract-Two types of single event effects - bit errors and single event functional interrupts - were observed during heavy-ion testing of the AD8151 crosspoint switch. Bit errors occurred in bursts with the average number of bits in a burst being dependent on both the ion LET and on the data rate. A pulsed laser was used to identify the locations on the chip where the bit errors and single event functional interrupts occurred. Bit errors originated in the switches, drivers, and output buffers. Single event functional interrupts occurred when the laser was focused on the second rank latch containing the data specifying the state of each switch in the 33x17 matrix.
The SEU rate in a flash ADC (AD9058) on board a space experiment varied by more than an order of magnitude, depending on the input. A pulsed laser aided in elucidating the reasons, which were found to be the result of the unique design of the AD9058.
The SEU rate in a flash ADC (AD9058) on board a space experiment varied by more than an order of magnitude, depending on the input. A pulsed laser aided in elucidating the reasons, which were found to be the result of the unique design of the AD9058.