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Brotz, Jay Kristoffer

Publications and source records attributed to Brotz, Jay Kristoffer.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept

Future nuclear arms - control agreements may place numerical limits on the total number of warheads in the nuclear arsenals of states. Verifying these limits may require inspectors to account for individual warheads, both deployed and non-deployed. This task could be accomplished with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. To resolve this dilemma, we revisit the so - called Buddy Tag concept first proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s. The conceptual innovation in the Buddy Tag was to by separate the tag from the treaty limited item itself. Verification of the pairings between tags and limited items would take place during a short-notice inspection, where the host would be required to produce one buddy tag for each item. Sensors on the Buddy Tag would show that it had not been moved to the inspected site after the inspection was declared (e.g., within the last 24-48 hours). If the inspector counted more (or fewer) treaty limited items than Buddy Tags at the inspected site, a treaty violation could be asserted. Using a number of single-site inspections, an inspecting party can hold the host at risk for discovery of violating the treaty at an enterprise level by possessing more treaty limited items than the treaty allows. In this project, we developed a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper summarizes the performance requirements for an advanced Buddy Tag, the proposed conduct of operations, the design choices and functionalities of the different subsystems, and initial testing results. The report also summarizes peer review feedback obtained throughout the project.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

Non-RF Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) Development Report

The Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) developed by Sandia National Laboratories is one of the most mature and well-studied active seals for use in containment applications for arms control treaty verification and international nuclear safeguards. However, its typical design includes wireless communications provided by a radio frequency (RF) transmitter and receiver. While this provides flexibility of movement for many applications, it is unnecessary and undesired for some treaty verification applications. This report details the design and construction of two variants of the CoCIM that remove the RF transmission capability in favor of directly connected wired and short-range infrared communications, as well as a new coordinator that is used to interface the CoCIM to a computer, and new interface software that is simplified for a likely inspection use case.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2017

Non-RF Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) User Manual.

This User Manual contains a description of the wired and infrared (IR) variants of the Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM), the Coordinator for reading stored messages, and the inspector Message Viewer user interface (UI) software, as well as instructions for use. This manual does not include descriptions or use instructions for the radio frequency (RF) variant of the CoCIM. The intended audience is planners and participants in treaty verification exercises where chain of custody (CoC) elements are required.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2017

FPGA Authentication Methods.

One of the greatest challenges facing designers of equipment to be used in a nuclear arms control treaty is how to convince the other party in the treaty to trust its results and functionality. Whether the host provides equipment meant to prove treaty obligations and the inspector needs to gain that trust (commonly referred to as authentication), or the inspector provides this equipment and the host needs to gain this trust (commonly considered to be included in certification), one party generally has higher confidence in the equipment at the start of a treaty regime and the other party needs to gain that confidence prior to use. While we focus on authentication in this document—that is, the inspector gaining confidence in host-provided equipment—our conclusions will likely apply to host certification of inspector-provided equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗