Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Bown, Rodney L..
A bibliography of computer security, integrity, and safety issues is given. The bibliography is divided into the following sections: recent national publications; books; journal, magazine articles, and miscellaneous reports; conferences, proceedings, and tutorials; and government documents and contractor reports.
A review is provided of the Formal Methods group discussions. It was stated that integrity is not a pure mathematical dual of security. The input data is part of the integrity domain. The group provided a roadmap for research. One item of the roadmap and the final position statement are closely related to the space shuttle and space station. The group's position is to use a safe subset of Ada. Examples of safe sets include the Army Secure Operating System and the Penelope Ada verification tool. It is recommended that a conservative attitude is required when writing Ada code for life and property critical systems.
Man rated NASA space vehicles seem to represent a set of ultimate critical computer applications. These applications require a high degree of security, integrity, and safety. A variety of formal and/or precise modeling techniques are becoming available for the designer of critical systems. The design phase of the software engineering life cycle includes the modification of non-development components. A review of the Estelle and LOTOS formal description languages is presented. Details of the languages and a set of references are provided. The languages were used to formally describe some of the Open System Interconnect (OSI) protocols.
The following subject areas are covered: a DOD development system - the Army Secure Operating System; non-development commercial computer systems; security, integrity, and assurance of service (SI and A); post delivery SI and A and malicious software; computer system unique attributes; positive feedback to commercial computer systems vendors; and NDI (Non-Development Item) computers and software safety.
Software engineering ethics is reviewed. The following subject areas are covered: lack of a system viewpoint; arrogance of PC DOS software vendors; violation od upward compatibility; internet worm; internet worm revisited; student cheating and company hiring interviews; computing practitioners and the commodity market; new projects and old programming languages; schedule and budget; and recent public domain comments.
The proper role and scope for the use of discrete mathematics and formal methods in support of engineering the security and integrity of components within deployed computer systems are discussed. It is proposed that the Z schema can be used as the specification language to capture the precise definition of system and component interfaces. This can be accomplished with an object oriented development paradigm.
The survivable, adaptable fiber optic embeddable network (SAFENET) is a draft standard for local area networking (LAN) developed by the Navy which, when adopted, will become a military standard. The standard is being developed for procurement specifications of computer resources to be used on ships and aircraft and has some of the real-time concerns that network standards for space vehicles have. Architecture and survivability are considered. It is noted that the token-ring LAN must implement the IEEE 802.5 recommended practice for dual ring reconfiguration, which is currently being reviewed for inclusion into the IEEE standard. A trunk coupling unit is used at each station to isolate a station from the ring in case of failure. Up to five stations can be bypassed in this fashion. Communication architecture has an OSI profile but differs from the standard concept of the seven layers by allowing alternate suits and breaking the layers into three groupings of services to allow for physical interfacing. It also provides several paths, even if only one profile is used. Management and synchronization protocols are discussed and security issues are addressed. Implications for aerospace applications are considered and it is projected that interoperability with the Navy and other U.S. Government systems may require SAFENET specifications for NASA systems.
Topics discussed include: test and verification; environment issues; distributed Ada issues; life cycle issues; Ada in Europe; management/training issues; common Ada interface set; and run time issues.
Topics discussed include: reusability; mission critical issues; run time; expert systems; language issues; life cycle issues; software tools; and computers for Ada.