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Beaver, Brian A.

Publications and source records attributed to Beaver, Brian A..

Recommended Screening Practices for Launch Collision Aviodance

The objective of this document is to assess the value of launch collision avoidance (COLA) practices and provide recommendations regarding its implementation for NASA robotic missions. The scope of this effort is limited to launch COLA screens against catalog objects that are either spacecraft or debris. No modifications to manned safety COLA practices are considered in this effort. An assessment of the value of launch COLA can be broken down into two fundamental questions: 1) Does collision during launch represent a significant risk to either the payload being launched or the space environment? 2) Can launch collision mitigation be performed in a manner that provides meaningful risk reduction at an acceptable level of operational impact? While it has been possible to piece together partial answers to these questions for some time, the first attempt to comprehensively address them is documented in reference (a), Launch COLA Operations: an Examination of Data Products, Procedures, and Thresholds, Revision A. This report is the product of an extensive study that addressed fundamental technical questions surrounding launch collision avoidance analysis and practice. The results provided in reference (a) will be cited throughout this document as these two questions are addressed. The premise of this assessment is that in order to conclude that launch COLA is a value-added activity, the answer to both of these questions must be affirmative. A "no" answer to either of these questions points toward the conclusion that launch COLA provides little or no risk mitigation benefit. The remainder of this assessment will focus on addressing these two questions.

recommended screening practicies luanch collision

A Geometric Analysis to Protect Manned Assets from Newly Launched Objects - Cola Gap Analysis

A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation, where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process. Once an object is launched, there is a finite period of time required to track, catalog, and evaluate that new object as part of standard onorbit COLA screening processes. Additionally, should a conjunction be identified, there is an additional period of time required to plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. While the computed prelaunch probability of collision with any object is extremely low, NASA/JSC has requested that all US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. This paper details a geometric-based COLA gap analysis method developed by the NASA Launch Services Program to determine if launch window cutouts are required to mitigate this risk. Additionally, this paper presents the results of several missions where this process has been used operationally.

Hametz, Mark E.

A Geometric Analysis to Protect Manned Assets from Newly Launched Objects - COLA Gap Analysis

A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation following the launch of GPS IIR-20 (March 24, 2009), when the spent upper stage of the launch vehicle unexpectedly crossed inside the ISS notification box shortly after launch. This event highlighted a 56-hour vulnerability period following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object. Current launch COLA processes screen each launched object across the launch window to determine if an object's nominal trajectory is predicted to pass within 200 km of the ISS (or any other manned/mannable object), resulting in a launch time closure. These launch COLA screens are performed from launch through separation plus I 00 minutes. Once the objects are in orbit, they are cataloged and evaluated as part of routine on-orbit conjunction assessment processes. However, as the GPS IIR-20 scenario illustrated, there is a vulnerability period in the time line between the end of launch COLA coverage and the beginning of standard on-orbit COLA assessment activities. The gap between existing launch and on-orbit COLA processes is driven by the time it takes to track and catalog a launched object, identify a conjunction, and plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. For the ISS, the total time required to accomplish an of these steps is 56 hours. To protect human lives, NASA/JSC has requested that an US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. The uncertainty in the state of a spent upper stage can be quite large after all bums are complete and all remaining propellants are expelled to safe the stage. Simply extending the launch COLA process an additional 56 hours is not a viable option as the 3-sigma position uncertainty will far exceed the 200 km miss-distance criterion. Additionally, performing a probability of collision (Pc) analysis over this period is also not practical due to the limiting effects of these large orbit state uncertainties. An estimated upper bound for Pc for a typical spent upper stage if nominally aligned for a direct broadside collision with the ISS is only on the order of 10-6. For a smaller manned object such as a Soyuz capsule, the risk level decreases to an order of 10'8 . In comparison, the Air Force Range policy (AFI 91-217) for launch COLAs would only eliminate launch opportunities when conjunctions with objects exceed a Pc of 10'5 This paper demonstrates a conservative geometry-based methodology that may be used to determine if launch opportunities pose a threat to the ISS during the COLA gap period. The NASA Launch Services Program at Kennedy Space Center has developed this COLA gap analysis method and employed it fQr three NASA missions to identify potential ISS conjunctions and corresponding launch window closures during the 56-hour at-risk period. In the analysis, for each launch opportunity, the nominal trajectory of the spent upper stage and the orbit state of the ISS are propagated over the 56 hour period. Each time the upper stage crosses the orbit plane of the ISS, the relative radial and argument of latitude separations are calculated. A window cutout is identified if these separation differences fall within a mission-specific violation box, which is determined from the evaluation of a Monte Carlo dispersions analysis that quantifies the potential variation in the upper stage radial and argument of latitude differences. This paper details the results of these analyses and their impacts to each mission.

Hametz, Mark E.

Titan III Feasibility for HL-20 Prototype Missions

A set of studies was performed to investigate the feasibility of using the Titan III launch vehicle to launch an unmanned prototype HL-20 personnel launch system and, potentially, operational HL-20 missions. The launch of an HL-20 spacecraft on a Titan III poses a unique set of concerns, primarily because the lifting body vehicle is carried on top of the Titan vehicle without a fairing. The Titan III/HL-20 feasibility study addressed the primary vehicle issues of performance, aerodynamics, loads, control and stability, launch availability, and vehicle configuration for the launch of an unmanned HL-20 prototype vehicle. Titan launch operations, launch site systems, and facilities were assessed to determine HL-20 operations compatibility. Additional studies determined the potential launch opportunity and window capabilities of the Titan III for the operational HL-20 mission and the existing Titan III's reliability. The feasibility study determined that the Titan III system, with minor changes, is compatible with the HL-20 vehicle and mission. It could provide nearly daily launch windows for a rendezvous with Space Station Freedom. Titan III reliability, when combined with the HL-20 launch escape system, provides a sufficiently high probability of crew survival to support its consideration as the primary vehicle for HL-20 operational missions.

Benson, Scott W.