Engineering topics

Barshi, Immanuel

Publications and source records attributed to Barshi, Immanuel.

At least 37 records · Page 2

NASA NTRS2016

Why Do People Make Mistakes?

Multitasking is endemic in modern life and work: drivers talk on cell phones, office workers type while answering phone calls, students do homework while text messaging, nurses prepare injections while responding to doctors calls, and air traffic controllers direct aircraft in one sector while handling additional traffic in another. Whether in daily life or at work, we are constantly bombarded with multiple, concurrent interruptions and demands and we have all somehow come to believe in the myth that we can, and in fact are expected to, easily address them all - without any repercussions. However, accumulating scientific evidence is now suggesting that multitasking increases the probability of human error. This talk presents a set of NASA studies that characterize concurrent demands in one work domain, routine airline cockpit operations, in order to illustrate the ways operational task demands together with the proclivity to manage them all concurrently make human performance in this and in any domain vulnerable to potentially serious errors and to accidents.

multitasking↗

NASA NTRS2016

Real-Time Early Warning Techniques

Contemporary approaches to aerospace vehicle system monitoring rely heavily on thresholds that represent a compromise between providing warning early enough to avert a mishap while simultaneously minimizing false alarms. While this reliance on thresholds has been in place for decades and has permeated both cockpits and control rooms, we often find it insufficient when retrospectively analyzing data from an accident. To modernize and enhance flight test safety, we introduce new methods of monitoring for anomalous patterns of interaction rather than for thresholds exceedance. For systems with a well characterized baseline we show how the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS), utilized by NASA in the aftermath of the Columbia accident, might be implemented in real-time to provide earlier warning than currently employed techniques. For systems without such a baseline, we introduce new developments in statistical methods relating to critical slowing down, first applied in medicine and physics, which show promise for adaptation to flight test. Finally, the familiar resource constrained environment leads to a reliance on increased instrumentation that is challenging the limits of the current one-sensor, one-indicator threshold paradigm. Existing methods thus fail to accurately reflect the true complexity of a vehicle rich with interdependent interacting systems. We highlight these concepts in a brief summary of the 2001 Air Transat Flight 236 deadstick landing in the Azores. We then suggest control room and cockpit modifications to better display the information gleaned using these novel monitoring methods.

Javorsek, Dan↗

NASA NTRS2016

Enhancing Flight Test Safety with Real-Time Early Warning Techniques

Contemporary approaches to aerospace vehicle system monitoring rely heavily on thresholds that represent a compromise between providing warning early enough to avert a mishap while simultaneously minimizing false alarms. While this reliance on thresholds has been in place for decades and has permeated both cockpits and control rooms, we often find it insufficient when retrospectively analyzing data from an accident. To modernize and enhance flight test safety, we introduce new methods of monitoring for anomalous patterns of interaction rather than for thresholds exceedance. For systems with a well characterized baseline we show how the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS), utilized by NASA in the aftermath of the Columbia accident, might be implemented in real-time to provide earlier warning than currently employed techniques. For systems without such a baseline, we introduce new developments in statistical methods relating to critical slowing down, first applied in medicine and physics, which show promise for adaptation to flight test. Finally, the familiar resource constrained environment leads to a reliance on increased instrumentation that is challenging the limits of the current "one-sensor, one-indicator" threshold paradigm. Existing methods thus fail to accurately reflect the true complexity of a vehicle rich with interdependent interacting systems. We highlight these concepts in a brief summary of the 2001 Air Transat Flight 236 deadstick landing in the Azores. We then suggest control room and cockpit modifications to better display the information gleaned using these novel monitoring methods.

Javorsek, Daniel, II↗

NASA NTRS2016

Human Research Program: Long Duration, Exploration-Class Mission Training Design

This is a presentation to the International Training Control Board that oversees astronaut training for ISS. The presentation explains the structure of HRP, the training-related work happening under the different program elements, and discusses in detail the research plan for the Training Risk under SHFHSHFE. The group includes the crew training leads for all the space agencies involved in ISS: Japan, Europe, Russia, Canada, and the US.

crew training↗

NASA NTRS2016

Evidence Report: Risk of Performance Errors Due to Training Deficiencies

Substantial evidence supports the claim that inadequate training leads to performance errors. Barshi and Loukopoulos (2012) demonstrate that even a task as carefully developed and refined over many years as operating an aircraft can be significantly improved by a systematic analysis, followed by improved procedures and improved training (see also Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009a). Unfortunately, such a systematic analysis of training needs rarely occurs during the preliminary design phase, when modifications are most feasible. Training is often seen as a way to compensate for deficiencies in task and system design, which in turn increases the training load. As a result, task performance often suffers, and with it, the operators suffer and so does the mission. On the other hand, effective training can indeed compensate for such design deficiencies, and can even go beyond to compensate for failures of our imagination to anticipate all that might be needed when we send our crew members to go where no one else has gone before. Much of the research literature on training is motivated by current training practices aimed at current training needs. Although there is some experience with operations in extreme environments on Earth, there is no experience with long-duration space missions where crews must practice semi-autonomous operations, where ground support must accommodate significant communication delays, and where so little is known about the environment. Thus, we must develop robust methodologies and tools to prepare our crews for the unknown. The research necessary to support such an endeavor does not currently exist, but existing research does reveal general challenges that are relevant to long-duration, high-autonomy missions. The evidence presented here describes issues related to the risk of performance errors due to training deficiencies. Contributing factors regarding training deficiencies may pertain to organizational process and training programs for spaceflight, such as when training programs are inadequate or unavailable. Furthermore, failure to match between tasks on the one hand, and learning and memory abilities on the other hand is a contributing factor, especially when individuals' relative efficiency with which new information is acquired, and adjustments made in behavior or thinking, are inconsistent with mission demands. Thus, if training deficiencies are present, the likelihood of errors or of the inability to successfully complete a task increases. What's more, the overall risk to the crew, the vehicle, and the mission increases.

Barshi, Immanuel↗

NASA NTRS2015

The Human Factors of an Early Space Accident: Flight 3-65 of the X-15

The X-15 was a critical research vehicle in the early days of space flight. On November 15, 1967, the X-15-3 suffered an in-flight breakup. This 191st flight of the X-15 and the 65th flight of this third configuration was the only fatal accident of the X-15 program. This paper presents an analysis, from a human factors perspective, of the events that led up to the accident. The analysis is based on the information contained in the report of the Air Force-NASA Accident Investigation Board (AIB) dated January, 1968. The AIBs analysis addressed, primarily, the events that occurred subsequent to the pilots taking direct control of the reaction control system. The analysis described here suggests that all of the events that caused the accident occurred well before the moment when the pilot switched to direct control. Consequently, the analyses and conclusions regarding the causal factors of, and the contributing factors to, the loss of Flight 3-65 presented here differ from those of the AIB based on the same evidence. Although the accident occurred in 1967, the results of the presented analysis are still relevant today. We present our analysis and discuss its implications for the safety of space operations.

accident investigation↗

NASA NTRS2014

The X-15 3-65 Accident: An Aircraft Systems and Flight Control Perspective

Despite the NASA X-15 program's outstanding success in developing and operating the first manned hypersonic research platform, the program suffered a fatal accident on November 15, 1967, when X-15-3, the only aircraft outfitted with advanced pilot displays and an adaptive flight control system, was lost after entering uncontrolled flight at an altitude of 230,000 feet and a velocity near Mach 5. The pilot, Major Michael J. Adams, was incapacitated by the aircraft accelerations and was killed either during the ensuing breakup or upon ground impact. In light of mitigating risk to current and emerging manned aerospace vehicles, a comprehensive systems level analysis of the accident is presented with a focus on the electrical power, flight control, and instrumentation failures that affected not only the vehicle dynamics but substantially impacted the pilot decisions that led to an inevitable loss of control. Insights based on reconstructed flight data as well as analysis and simulation of the X-15's unique adaptive control system, yield new conclusions about the reasons for the control systems anomalous behavior and the system-level interactions and human-machine interface design oversights that led to the accident.

Accident Investigation↗

NASA NTRS2014

A Comprehensive Analysis of the X-15 Flight 3-65 Accident

The November 15, 1967, loss of X-15 Flight 3-65-97 (hereafter referred to as Flight 3-65) was a unique incident in that it was the first and only aerospace flight accident involving loss of crew on a vehicle with an adaptive flight control system (AFCS). In addition, Flight 3-65 remains the only incidence of a single-pilot departure from controlled flight of a manned entry vehicle in a hypersonic flight regime. To mitigate risk to emerging aerospace systems, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) proposed a comprehensive review of this accident. The goal of the assessment was to resolve lingering questions regarding the failure modes of the aircraft systems (including the AFCS) and thoroughly analyze the interactions among the human agents and autonomous systems that contributed to the loss of the pilot and aircraft. This document contains the outcome of the accident review.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Specificity and Transfer in Learning How to Follow Navigation Instructions

We report a series of experiments that use a navigation task in which instructions for navigating in a space displayed as grids on a computer screen are given to subjects who then attempt to follow them by mouse clicking on the grids. The navigation task was broken down into component dimensions (e.g., presentation mode of the instructions, length of the instructions, characteristics of the display, size of the grids, response type). For each task dimension, one condition was used at training and the same or another condition was used at test. Each task dimension was examined in terms of two measures. One measure provided an index of transfer (i.e., better performance at test than at training when test and training involved different conditions), and the other provided an index of specificity (i.e., better performance at test when training and test conditions were the same than when training and test conditions were different). By and large, these two indices were complementary, so there was evidence of either transfer or specificity but not both. For one dimension transfer but no specificity was evident, and for another dimension specificity but no transfer was evident. For the remaining dimensions, however, there was asymmetrical transfer, with transfer evident for some conditions and specificity evident for others. The findings are interpreted within the procedural reinstatement framework. They have practical implications concerning how to optimize training and how much fidelity to the testing situation is necessary when training.

Healy, Alice F.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Evidence Report: Risk of Performance Errors Due to Training Deficiencies

The Risk of Performance Errors Due to Training Deficiencies is identified by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Research Program (HRP) as a recognized risk to human health and performance in space. The HRP Program Requirements Document (PRD) defines these risks. This Evidence Report provides a summary of the evidence that has been used to identify and characterize this risk. Given that training content, timing, intervals, and delivery methods must support crew task performance, and given that training paradigms will be different for long-duration missions with increased crew autonomy, there is a risk that operators will lack the skills or knowledge necessary to complete critical tasks, resulting in flight and ground crew errors and inefficiencies, failed mission and program objectives, and an increase in crew injuries.

Barshi, Immanuel↗

NASA NTRS2011

Houston, We Have a Problem Solving Model for Training

In late 2006, the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at NASA began looking at ways to make training more efficient for the flight controllers who support the International Space Station. The average certification times for flight controllers spanned from 18 months to three years and the MOD, responsible for technical training, was eager to develop creative solutions that would reduce the time to 12 months. Additionally, previously trained flight controllers sometimes participated in more than 50 very costly, eight-hour integrated simulations before becoming certified. New trainees needed to gain proficiency with far fewer lessons and training simulations than their predecessors. This poster presentation reviews the approach and the process that is currently in development to accomplish this goal.

Schmidt, Lacey↗

NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors Research for Space Exploration: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation

Kaiser, Mary K.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors in Training

Future space missions will be significantly longer than current shuttle missions and new systems will be more complex than current systems. Increasing communication delays between crews and Earth-based support means that astronauts need to be prepared to handle the unexpected on their own. As crews become more autonomous, their potential span of control and required expertise must grow to match their autonomy. It is not possible to train for every eventuality ahead of time on the ground, or to maintain trained skills across long intervals of disuse. To adequately prepare NASA personnel for these challenges, new training approaches, methodologies, and tools are required. This research project aims at developing these training capabilities. By researching established training principles, examining future needs, and by using current practices in space flight training as test beds, both in Flight Controller and Crew Medical domains, this research project is mitigating program risks and generating templates and requirements to meet future training needs. Training efforts in Fiscal Year 09 (FY09) strongly focused on crew medical training, but also began exploring how Space Flight Resource Management training for Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Controllers could be integrated with systems training for optimal Mission Control Center (MCC) operations. The Training Task addresses Program risks that lie at the intersection of the following three risks identified by the Project: 1) Risk associated with poor task design; 2) Risk of error due to inadequate information; and 3) Risk associated with reduced safety and efficiency due to poor human factors design.

Barshi, Immanuel↗

NASA NTRS2010

Performance Support Tools for Space Medical Operations

Early Constellation space missions are expected to have medical capabilities similar to those currently on board the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS). Flight surgeons on the ground in Mission Control will direct the Crew Medical Officer (CMO) during medical situations. If the crew is unable to communicate with the ground, the CMO will carry out medical procedures without the aid of a flight surgeon. In these situations, use of performance support tools can reduce errors and time to perform emergency medical tasks. The research presented here is part of the Human Factors in Training Directed Research Project of the Space Human Factors Engineering Project under the Space Human Factors and Habitability Element of the Human Research Program. This is a joint project consisting of human factors teams from the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and the Ames Research Center (ARC). Work on medical training has been conducted in collaboration with the Medical Training Group at JSC and with Wyle that provides medical training to crew members, biomedical engineers (BMEs), and flight surgeons under the Bioastronautics contract. Human factors personnel at Johnson Space Center have investigated medical performance support tools for CMOs and flight surgeons.

Byrne, Vicky↗

NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors Research for Space Exploration: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation

As part of NASA's Human Research Program, the Space Human Factors Engineering Project serves as the bridge between Human Factors research and Human Spaceflight applications. Our goal is to be responsive to the operational community while addressing issues at a sufficient level of abstraction to ensure that our tools and solutions generalize beyond the point design. In this panel, representatives from four of our research domains will discuss the challenges they face in solving current problems while also enabling future capabilities. Historically, engineering-dominated organizations have tended to view good Human Factors (HF) as a desire rather than a requirement in system design and development. Our field has made significant gains in the past decade, however; the Department of Defense, for example, now recognizes Human-System Integration (HSI), of which HF is a component, as an integral part of their divisions hardware acquisition processes. And our own agency was far more accepting of HF/HSI requirements during the most recent vehicle systems definition than in any prior cycle. Nonetheless, HF subject matter experts at NASA often find themselves in catch up mode... coping with legacy systems (hardware and software) and procedures that were designed with little regard for the human element, and too often with an attitude of we can deal with any operator issues during training. Our challenge, then, is to segregate the true knowledge gaps in Space Human Factors from the prior failures to incorporate best (or even good) HF design principles. Further, we strive to extract the overarching core HF issues from the point-design-specific concerns that capture the operators (and managers) attention. Generally, our approach embraces a 3M approach to Human Factors: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation. Our first step is to measure human performance, to move from subjective anecdotes to objective, quantified data. Next we model the phenomenon, using appropriate methods in our field, modifying them to suit the unique aspects of the space environment. Finally, we develop technologies, tools, and procedures to mitigate the decrements in human performance and capabilities that occur in space environments. When successful, we decrease risks to crew safety and to mission success. When extremely successful (or lucky), we devise generalizable solutions that advance the state of our practice. Our panel is composed of researchers from diverse domains of our project... from different boxes, if you will, of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).

Kaiser, Mary K.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Human Factors in Training

Future space missions will be significantly longer than current shuttle missions and new systems will be more complex than current systems. Increasing communication delays between crews and Earth-based support means that astronauts need to be prepared to handle the unexpected on their own. As crews become more autonomous, their potential span of control and required expertise must grow to match their autonomy. It is not possible to train for every eventuality ahead of time on the ground, or to maintain trained skills across long intervals of disuse. To adequately prepare NASA personnel for these challenges, new training approaches, methodologies, and tools are required. This research project aims at developing these training capabilities. By researching established training principles, examining future needs, and by using current practices in space flight training as test beds, both in Flight Controller and Crew Medical domains, this research project is mitigating program risks and generating templates and requirements to meet future training needs. Training efforts in Fiscal Year 08 (FY08) strongly focused on crew medical training, but also began exploring how Space Flight Resource Management training for Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Controllers could be integrated with systems training for optimal Mission Control Center (MCC) operations. The Training Task addresses Program risks that lie at the intersection of the following three risks identified by the Project: (1) Risk associated with poor task design (2) Risk of error due to inadequate information (3) Risk associated with reduced safety and efficiency due to poor human factors design

Barshi, Immanuel↗

NASA NTRS2009

Mentoring SFRM: A New Approach to International Space Station Flight Control Training

The Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) of the Johnson Space Center is responsible for providing continuous operations support for the International Space Station (ISS). Operations support requires flight controllers who are skilled in team performance as well as the technical operations of the ISS. Space Flight Resource Management (SFRM), a NASA adapted variant of Crew Resource Management (CRM), is the competency model used in the MOD. ISS flight controller certification has evolved to include a balanced focus on development of SFRM and technical expertise. The latest challenge the MOD faces is how to certify an ISS flight controller (Operator) to a basic level of effectiveness in 1 year. SFRM training uses a twopronged approach to expediting operator certification: 1) imbed SFRM skills training into all Operator technical training and 2) use senior flight controllers as mentors. This paper focuses on how the MOD uses senior flight controllers as mentors to train SFRM skills.

Huning, Therese↗

NASA NTRS2009

Performance Support Tools for Space Medical Operations

The early Constellation space missions are expected to have medical capabilities very similar to those currently on the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS). For Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) missions to ISS, medical equipment will be located on ISS, and carried into CEV in the event of an emergency. Flight Surgeons (FS) on the ground in Mission Control will be expected to direct the Crew Medical Officer (CMO) during medical situations. If there is a loss of signal and the crew is unable to communicate with the ground, a CMO would be expected to carry out medical procedures without the aid of a FS. In these situations, performance support tools can be used to reduce errors and time to perform emergency medical tasks. Human factors personnel at Johnson Space Center have recently investigated medical performance support tools for CMOs on-orbit, and FSs on the ground. This area of research involved the feasibility of Just-in-time (JIT) training techniques and concepts for real-time medical procedures. In Phase 1, preliminary feasibility data was gathered for two types of prototype display technologies: a hand-held PDA, and a Head Mounted Display (HMD). The PDA and HMD were compared while performing a simulated medical procedure using ISS flight-like medical equipment. Based on the outcome of Phase 1, including data on user preferences, further testing was completed using the PDA only. Phase 2 explored a wrist-mounted PDA, and compared it to a paper cue card. For each phase, time to complete procedures, errors, and user satisfaction were captured. Information needed by the FS during ISS mission support, especially for an emergency situation (e.g. fire onboard ISS), may be located in many different places around the FS s console. A performance support tool prototype is being developed to address this issue by bringing all of the relevant information together in one place. The tool is designed to include procedures and other information needed by a FS during an emergency, as well as procedures and information to be used after the emergency is resolved. Several walkthroughs of the prototype with FSs have been completed within a mockup of an ISS FS console. Feedback on the current tool design as well as recommendations for existing ISS FS displays were captured.

Byrne, Vicky E.↗