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Bakel, A.

Publications and source records attributed to Bakel, A..

Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3 He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3 He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3 He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3 He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3 He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3 He-alternative technologies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Radio of Nitrate and Sulfate Solutions

Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) is assisting two of the potential domestic producers, Babcock and Wilcox Technical Services Group (B&W) and Morgridge Institute for Research (MIR), in the development of a Mo-99 production pathway that do not use high enriched uranium (HEU), as part of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s (GTRI) program. B&W is developing the Medical Isotope Production System (MIPS); in this system, the Mo-99 is produced in a low enriched uranium (LEU)-fueled aqueous homogenous reactor (AHR) by the fission of U-235. MIR is developing the Subcritical Hybrid Intense Neutron Emitter (SHINE), which creates Mo-99 by neutroninduced fission of LEU in a sub-critical aqueous solution. One difference between the two is that MIR is considering aqueous uranyl-sulfate as the target solution, while B&W is planning to use aqueous uranyl nitrate as the fuel solution.

Kalensky, M.↗

Status Report for Development of Advanced Process Monitoring Concepts for IAEA Safeguards Sponsored by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)

Process monitoring (PM) is used in international safeguards as an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). For large throughput nuclear facilities such as commercial spent fuel reprocessing plants, it is difficult to satisfy the lAEA's goal for detection probability using NMA alone. And, for an facilities, regardless of their throughput, PM can provide redundant verification for both NMA and containment and surveillance and can be used to detect abnormal plant operation through the use of IAEA's instrumentation and selected operator's process control instrumentation. Examples of PM include (1) continuity of knowledge of nuclear material flows and inventories by monitoring of tank solution levels in reprocessing plants, (2) load cell monitoring of cylinders in GCEPs, (3) thermal power monitoring of large research reactors to detect undeclared operation, and (4) providing data to enable frequent NMA-like evaluation (near-real-time-accounting), which involves a hybrid of NMA and PM, for many facility types. Sensors required for PM include for example sensors for measuring flow, volume, density, level, temperature, and other diverse sensors such as portal monitors, video cameras, motion detectors, and gamma and neutron detectors. Additionally, PM lends itself to remote and/or unattended monitoring which has the potential to reduce the IAEA inspection burden and intrusiveness to the operator.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Speciation and Concentrations of Metals in a Homogeneous Reactor Fuel Solution

Argonne National Laboratory scientists and engineers are collaborating with personnel from Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) to help optimize the design of their Medical Isotope Production System (MIPS). The major components of the MIPS are a homogeneous solution reactor containing low-enriched uranyl nitrate fuel, a molybdenum extraction system consisting of anion exchange columns, and an off-gas treatment facility. The MIPS project is of high priority because it would provide an industrial-scale domestic source of medical isotopes that is not currently available.

Jerden, J.↗

Sorbent Selection Progress Report

This report describes batch studies comparing the uptake of 99 Mo from uranium solutions, chemical and radiolytic stability, and sorbent physical properties. The uranyl nitrate concentration being considered for AHR operation is 150 g-U/L at a pH 1.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗