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Ashok, Aditya

Publications and source records attributed to Ashok, Aditya.

At least 19 records

ByzSec — A Multi-layered Byzantine Resilient Architecture for Bulk Power System Protective Relays

Reliability, selectivity, and sensitivity are the fundamental attributes of any protection system, acting as the main drivers in the selection of schemes, and equipment. In high-voltage systems, microprocessor-based relays represent the industry’s preferred solution, providing engineers with a vast array of benefits. However, they remain vulnerable to cybersecurity events that may compromise their functionality. To help mitigate against potential cybersecurity risks, this paper presents a fault-tolerant, Byzantine Resilient (BR) architecture that significantly increases the cybersecurity attributes of a protection system while minimizing the amount of performance impacts and integration overheads introduced. The solution relies on an array of independent relays that utilize robust consensus methods (based on Spire [1], [2]) to ensure correct system behavior is achieved even when a relay has been compromised. Furthermore, the solution has been complemented with a custom-built Situational Awareness engine that can be used to detect and identify potential threats. The implemented solution has been developed in consultation with three hardware vendors and has been tested to comply with the performance requirements of a 345kV differential protection scheme (87T). The results indicate that the proposed architecture is a comprehensive solution that: supports the strict correctness and performance requirements of the bulk power grid while providing a cost-effective alternative that offers a seamless, long-term solution.

byzantine security, Fault Tolerant Application Sof↗

Design and Development of a High Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed

In order to ensure that future critical infrastructure systems are resilient to various types of such advanced and persistent threats, it is important to develop and integrate tailored solutions that holistically address cyber-attack detection and mitigation in a timely manner such that adverse system impacts that impact a large population are avoided. Further, it is essential to create environments that allow control, protection and communication to exist within a realistic environment to analyze the effects of adverse conditions and system operating modes. This project aims to establish a high-fidelity testbed environment for modeling and simulating a single microgrid all the way up to a network of microgrids along with baseline controls, protection, and associated cyber communication. This is an important activity because accurately modeling and simulating the various power-electronics-based DERs and loads in a microgrid is critical to adequately capturing their behaviors over a wide range of off-normal conditions, as well as to evaluate the resilience of the system using the developed controls. The work presented in this report focuses on the process of building this high-fidelity testbed and the associated experimentation it enables. The model enables the creation of high-fidelity use cases and associated datasets that have been used extensively within the initiative to study resilience and support novel control development and prototyping. The work heavily leverages existing capability that is part of the high-fidelity cyber-physical system experimentation lab to create a power hardware-in-the-loop setup. The report also details the creation of an automated model building platform that can enable high-fidelity real-time models to be built without much effort allowing existing low-fidelity models to be analyzed in higher fidelity. Lastly, the report also discusses efforts center around scaling to large complex power system models to make the experimentation more effective.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

pnnl/ssass-e

SSASSE software is responsible for validating, and verifying innovative safe scanning methodologies, models, architectures, and prototypes to safely assess operational technology (OT) installed in critical energy infrastructure.

Niddodi, Shwetha↗

A High-Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed-Based Benchmarking Dataset For Testing Operational Technology Specific Intrusion Detection Systems

Quality datasets serve a critical purpose in cyber security research. Data is needed to understand system behavior and develop security controls to protect critical systems. However, for critical infrastructure operational environments there is a lack of available datasets to study because of the high cost and specialized capabilities necessary to generate them. This paper documents the development of a dataset of high fidelity hardware in the loop laboratory simulated models of electric and natural gas distribution systems with real cyber attack test cases. A deep dive discussion for the experimental setup and controls for generating the data is provided along with observations from using the data in evaluating intrusion detection approaches.

Ashok, Aditya↗

Electricity and Gas IDS Dataset

The following dataset was collected from a set of cybersecurity experiments conducted in an Electricity and Natural Gas environment. The architecture was instantiated within the powerNET testbed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and is comprised of both simulated components and hardware-in-the-loop devices. The test environment consisted of a substation and control center network representative of electrical systems. In addition, it also contained a compressor station, and an odorizer and pressure regulation station representative of oil and natural gas systems. The various devices on the electrical and gas systems were organized into multiple networks to mimic real-world deployments. There were 14 testing scenarios overall that covered a wide variety of cybersecurity and infrastructure events.

Industrial Control↗

Electricity and Gas IDS Dataset

The following dataset was collected from a set of cybersecurity experiments conducted in an Electricity and Natural Gas environment. The architecture was instantiated within the powerNET testbed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and is comprised of both simulated components and hardware-in-the-loop devices. The test environment consisted of a substation and control center network representative of electrical systems. In addition, it also contained a compressor station, and an odorizer and pressure regulation station representative of oil and natural gas systems. The various devices on the electrical and gas systems were organized into multiple networks to mimic real-world deployments. There were 14 testing scenarios overall that covered a wide variety of cybersecurity and infrastructure events.

Industrial Control↗

VARS Framework

The Verification and Validation Assuring Reliability and Security (VARS) project team has developed the proof-of-concept VARS framework which will be implemented in the form of a software tool called Risk-Informed Verification and Validation Recommendation (RIVVR). The framework will provide Energy Delivery System (EDS) stakeholders with cybersecurity focused verification and validation (V&V) approach which includes list of potentially relevant vulnerabilities to test or address, pre-procurement guidance, and separate lists of relevant standards, tools, and techniques (ST2) to be considered by utilities and vendors

Pal, Seemita↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

PRIME: a real-time cyber-physical systems testbed: from wide-area monitoring, protection, and control prototyping to operator training and beyond

As the power grid continues to evolve with advanced wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) algorithms, there is an increasing need for realistic testbed environments with industry-grade software and hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) to perform verification and validation studies. Such testbed environments serve as ideal platforms to perform WAMPAC prototyping, operator training, and also to study the impacts of different types of cyberattack scenarios on the operation of the grid. In this paper, we introduce PRIME (PNNL cybeR physIcal systeMs tEstbed): the testbed that integrates real-time transmission system simulator with commercial industry grade energy management system (EMS) software and remote hardware-in-the-loop (RHIL). PRIME is an end-to-end, modular testbed that allows high-fidelity RHIL experimentation of a power system. We present two detailed case studies (fault location and clearing in transmission system, and operator training) to showcase the capabilities of our PRIME testbed. Finally, we briefly discuss some of the potential limitations of our testbed in terms of scalability and flexibility to setup larger test systems and identify directions for future work to address those limitations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic well being. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyber attacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal is to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The team consisted of leading experts from two major universities – Iowa State University, Washington State University – complemented by reputed researchers from two DOE national laboratories – Pacific Northwest National Lab, and Argonne National Lab, one major utility vendor GE Global Research, and one utility partner – Cedar Falls Utilities (CFU). The team members have proven track record of successful academic-industry collaboration in interdisciplinary R&D projects, and bring onboard some of the best state-of-the-art testbed resources, industry-grade SCADA/EMS/DMS environment for experimentation and field demonstration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Understanding Impacts of Data Integrity Attacks on Transactive Control Systems

With the rapid growth of internet-connected smart devices capable of exchanging energy price information and adaptively controlling energy consumption of connected loads, the role of transactive control is expected to become more prominent in the modern grid. Transactive control systems integrate the wholesale and retail energy markets, and enable active participation of end users, thereby playing a key role in managing the rising number of distributed assets in the smart grid. The use of internet for the communication of data between the controllers at the building, distribution, and transmission levels makes the system susceptible to cyber-attacks. A skilled adversary can potentially manipulate the exchanged data with the intention of inflicting damage to the system. In this paper, four categories of metrics are put forth for evaluating the performance of the system when under data integrity attacks. A model for scaling-based data integrity attack has been described, and co-simulations have been performed on a 240 bus WECC transmission system model with detailed modeling of distribution systems at specific buses. Our results show that scaling-based data integrity attacks can have non-trivial impacts on the operational, financial, and comfort aspects of the transactive control system.

Smart grid, transactive control system, Buildings-↗

An Automated Disruption-Tolerant Key Management Framework for Critical Systems

Key management is critical to secure operation. Distributed control systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, have unique operational requirements that make conventional key management solutions less effective and burdensome. This paper presents a novel Kerberos-based framework for automated, disruption-tolerant key management for control system environments. Here, experimental tests and their results are presented to quantify the expected performance overhead of this approach. Additionally, Zeek sensor analytics are presented to aid in monitoring the health and security of the key management framework operation.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

An Automated, Disruption-Tolerant Device Authentication and Key Management Framework for Critical Systems

Key management is critical to secure operation. Distributed control systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, have unique operational requirements that make conventional key management solutions less effective and burdensome. In this paper a novel Kerberos based framework for automated, disruption-tolerant key management for control system environments is presented. Experimental tests and their results are presented to quantify expected performance overhead of this approach. In addition, Zeek sensor analytics are presented to monitor the health and security of the key management framework operation.

Edgar, Thomas W.↗

A Multi-level Fidelity Microgrid Testbed Model for Cybersecurity Experimentation

When experimenting with cybersecurity technologies for industrial control systems, it is often difficult to develop a realistic, self-contained model that provides an ability to easily measure the effects of cyber behavior on the associated physical system. To address this challenge, we have created and instantiated a microgrid cyber-physical model, where both the power distribution and the individual loads are under the control and authority of one entity. This enables cybersecurity experimentation where attacks against the physical system (grid and buildings) can be measured and defended from a single entities infrastructure. To achieve the appropriate levels of fidelity for cybersecurity effects, our microgrid model integrates multiple levels of simulation, hardware-in-the-loop, and virtualization. In this paper, we present how we designed and instantiated this test case model in a testbed infrastructure, our efforts to validate its operation, and an exemplary multistage attack scenario to showcase the model's utility.

Ashok, Aditya↗

pnnl/ADTKM

ADTKM Disruption Tolerant Key Management

Seppala, Garret↗

Employing a User-Centered Design Process for Cybersecurity Awareness in the Power Grid

In this paper, we discuss the process we are using in the design and implementation of a tool to improve the situation awareness of cyberattacks in the power grid. We provide details on the steps we have taken to date and describe the steps that still need to be accomplished. The focus of this work is to provide situation awareness (SA) (Endsley, 1995) of the power grid to staff from different, non-overlapping roles in an electrical transmission organization in order to facilitate an understanding of a possible occurrence of a cyberattack. Our approach follows a user-centered design process and includes determining the types of information to display, the format of the displays, and the personnel to whom the display should be shown. Additionally there is the issue of how much help the tool can provide in the way of assessing the probability of a cyberattack given the current status of various portions of the power grid. Regardless, the ability to provide a common operating picture should enable the various groups to collaborate on a response.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Characterizing cyber tools for monitoring power grid systems: what information is available and who needs it?

Abstract—The power grid is a complex, interconnected system that requires the coordination of multiple entities ensure the reliability of the system. System operators must be aware of the impacts of various natural and man-made contingencies through telemetry from their control systems, and they must also be aware of the integrity and availability of the cyber assets on their systems. A team of researchers from PNNL and INL have conducted a series of observations and interviews at power utilities to identify what information needs to be available for both control room dispatchers and cyber security analysts to maintain situation awareness of cyber security to effectively monitor the cyber assets on utility control systems. The researchers interviewed and observed control room dispatchers and spoke with regional control system engineers and cyber security analysts to define the context in which such information would be used. The results of this work will inform the design of a tool that will enhance cyber situation awareness and help facilitate effective communication between the various roles and organizations with utility and other regional authorities during contingencies. Index Terms—

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Testbed Environment for Buildings-to-Grid Cyber Resilience Research and Development

The Smart Grid is characterized by the proliferation of advanced digital controllers at all levels of its operational hierarchy from generation to end consumption. Such controllers within modern residential and commercial buildings enable grid operators to exercise fine-grained control over energy consumption through several emerging Buildings-to-Grid (B2G) applications. Though this capability promises significant benefits in terms of operational economics and improved reliability, cybersecurity weaknesses in the supporting infrastructure could be exploited to cause a detrimental effect and this necessitates focused research efforts on two fronts. First, the understanding of how cyber attacks in the B2G space could impact grid reliability and to what extent. Second, the development and validation of cyber-physical application-specific countermeasures that are complementary to traditional infrastructure cybersecurity mechanisms for enhanced cyber attack detection and mitigation. The PNNL B2G testbed is currently being developed to address these core research needs. Specifically, the B2G testbed combines high-fidelity buildings+grid simulators, industry-grade building automation and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in an integrated, realistic, and reconfigurable environment capable of supporting attack-impact-detection-mitigation experimentation. In this paper, we articulate the need for research testbeds to model various B2G applications broadly by looking at the end-to-end operational hierarchy of the Smart Grid. Finally, the paper not only describes the architecture of the B2G testbed in detail, but also addresses the broad spectrum of B2G resilience research it is capable of supporting based on the smart grid operational hierarchy identified earlier.

Sridhar, Siddharth↗