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Anthony DiVenti

Publications and source records attributed to Anthony DiVenti.

7 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2023

NASA Exploration Systems Maintainability Standards for Artemis and Beyond

This assessment was requested by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), which, based on findings from the NESC study “Safe Human Expeditions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO)” (Valinia et al., 2022), determined its topic to be an underrecognized critical and urgent Agency need, due to impending Artemis vehicle procurements. The principal objective of this assessment was to review and update current Agency-level maintainability requirements for space systems to support crew on expeditions beyond LEO in both preventive and corrective maintenance. This report contains the results of the NESC assessment.

Orbital Replacement Units↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Physics of Failure (PoF) for Reliability

An item’s reliability or longevity is dependent not only on its design but also on how it is used, manufactured, tested, and the stresses it has or will experience. Stresses include operational and environmental exposures to thermal, voltage, current, age/exposure, mechanical, and radiation mechanisms. Therefore, in reliability analysis, it is important to consider the contributions of all these factors when predicting the failure rates of components. Historically, there has been a reliance on handbook data (e.g., MIL-HDBK-217), but experience has shown that these values and distributions are not representative of actual performance. Therefore, to make more credible reliability and risk assessments for its missions, NASA must transition to estimating likelihoods of failure based on an item’s reliability or longevity factors (or the physical susceptibilities and strengths impacting the design’s performance) has or will experience, whenever possible. To facilitate this transition, a Handbook on Methodology for Physics of Failure Based Reliability Assessments has been developed by NASA to assist in applying physics experiences or experimental physics for empirical analysis and conceptualized physics exposures or theoretical physics for deterministic analysis, to develop and aggregate realistic likelihoods of failure leading to more credible forecasts of item performance and longevity. In addition, since it is NASA’s intention that this document continues to evolve based on community lessons learned and the introduction of new assessment methodologies, NASA is encouraging and appreciates the contributions of current and future authors to maintain and enhance this handbook and its supporting case studies.

PoF↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Safety, Reliability, and Mission Assurance Digital Future

The evolution from “document-centric” to “data-centric” and “model-centric” information leveraging structured data and model-based approaches is at the heart of digital engineering transformational efforts underway across industry and government. It is these approaches that pave the way for data lakes, Authoritative Sources of Truth (ASOTs), and systems- of-systems interoperability and the corresponding transformational benefits thereof. Such benefits include increased data availability, data access equity, data traceability, real-time analytics, batch analytics, and (most importantly) acceleration of the time-to-value and time-to-insights associated with engineering products and analyses. The longer-term benefits of reusability, customization and traceability are even more promising. For Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA), and Mission Success (SMS) activities; realization of such benefits is essential to provide engineers and analysts alike vital information when needed to support critical decision making throughout the entire life cycle. The SMA community often operate in parallel with engineering activities, for which information exchange with relevant context is paramount. Far too often, such information lags key decision points and/or is absent of the robust, integrated, knowledge needed, given inherent barriers associated with traditional document-centric means to data sharing, analysis, and reporting. This paper provides an overview of how NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is evolving its policies, standards, guidance, and training to transform to eliminate such barriers, thus realizing the benefits emerging in this new digital era. A roadmap for achieving this digital future is presented along with key building blocks involving use and implementation of concepts such as: Objectives-Hierarchies, Objective-Driven Requirements, Accepted Standards, Safety and Assurance Cases, data digitization (i.e., ontologies, structured data, and model-centric data), FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, & Reusable) and/or FAIRUST (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Reusable, Understandable, Secure, and Trusted) principles [1]. This paper also describes how OSMA, leveraging the Agency’s overall commitment to Digital Transformation (DT), is using the power of Policy, “Digital” Domain representation, Product Evolution, and Community Outreach and Engagement as part of a strategic vision and roadmap to evolve and transform its SMA organizations to become better able to serve its stakeholders and customers. Future publications will elaborate on these building blocks and deeper concepts.

Authoritative Source of Truth (ASOT),↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Digital Transformation for NASA Nuclear Flight Safety

The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA)’s Nuclear Flight Safety discipline is exploring opportunities to combine incremental advancements in many contributing areas in a way that produces a transformative change for how work is performed. More specifically, after providing some general NASA and space nuclear policy background, the authors will describe concepts and efforts that enable: (i) the use of objectives-d riven approaches (in concert with internal and external constraints) to establish a mission risk posture; (ii) the use of that risk posture in the planning process to risk-inform the selection of Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) methods and models; (iii) use of model-based and machine-assisted techniques to manage the complex and ponderous amount of information and interfaces that typify spaceflight efforts; (iv ) the means by which that infrastructure can directly feed an assurance case (including use of systems modelling language, ontological formulation, and semantic web technology) so as to address known weaknesses in our ability to communicate and manage that complexity; and (v) use of that case-assured framework to demonstrate that one did the adequate and sufficient S&MS work and that the S&MS work was done competently.

Donald Helton↗